Cybersecurity information sharing between public–private sector agencies by Kaijankoski, Eric A.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2015-03
Cybersecurity information sharing between
þÿ p u b l i c  p r i v a t e   s e c t o r   a g e n c i e s
Kaijankoski, Eric A.














Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
CYBERSECURITY INFORMATION SHARING 








Thesis Advisor: Erik J. Dahl 
Second Reader: Wade Huntley 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202–4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704–0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
March 2015 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  
CYBERSECURITY INFORMATION SHARING BETWEEN PUBLIC–PRIVATE 
SECTOR AGENCIES 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
6. AUTHOR(S) Eric A. Kaijankoski 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943–5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER   
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
  AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
Government agencies, businesses, and individuals alike have become more dependent on technology, and the desire 
and need for interconnectedness has led to increasing network vulnerability affecting both government and private 
sectors. Recognizing both government and private sector agencies individually lack the capabilities to defend against 
cyber threats, President Obama has called for a more robust and resilient cybersecurity alliance that encourages 
information-sharing partnerships with private sector owners and operators in charge of protecting U.S. critical 
infrastructure. Despite the recent drive for cyber legislation and policies, government agencies and private companies 
have seemed reluctant to share information related to cyber-attacks and threats with one another. 
To discover the deeper underlying issues that inhibit public-private cooperation, and to evaluate the effectiveness 
of public-private partnerships (PPPs) to advance cyber information sharing, this thesis examines the banking and 
finance sector of U.S. critical infrastructure sector. In doing so, it identifies reasons why information-sharing 
problems exist between government agencies and private companies; investigates how PPPs satisfy national 
cybersecurity needs; and, in turn, reveals issues for policymakers to consider when shaping policies that encourage an 




14. SUBJECT TERMS  
Cybersecurity, Public-Private Partnerships, Critical Infrastructure, Cyber-attacks 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
99 

















NSN 7540–01–280–5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
CYBERSECURITY INFORMATION SHARING BETWEEN PUBLIC–PRIVATE 
SECTOR AGENCIES 
Eric A. Kaijankoski 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
 B.S., Thomas Edison State College, 2009 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES  
(HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE) 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
March 2015 
Author: Eric A. Kaijankoski 
Approved by: Erik J. Dahl 
Thesis Advisor 
Wade Huntley  
Second Reader 
Mohammed Hafez, PhD. 
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs 
 iv




Government agencies, businesses, and individuals alike have become more dependent on 
technology, and the desire and need for interconnectedness has led to increasing network 
vulnerability affecting both government and private sectors. Recognizing both 
government and private sector agencies individually lack the capabilities to defend 
against cyber threats, President Obama has called for a more robust and resilient 
cybersecurity alliance that encourages information-sharing partnerships with private 
sector owners and operators in charge of protecting U.S. critical infrastructure. Despite 
the recent drive for cyber legislation and policies, government agencies and private 
companies have seemed reluctant to share information related to cyber-attacks and threats 
with one another. 
To discover the deeper underlying issues that inhibit public-private cooperation, 
and to evaluate the effectiveness of public-private partnerships (PPPs) to advance cyber 
information sharing, this thesis examines the banking and finance sector of U.S. critical 
infrastructure sector. In doing so, it identifies reasons why information-sharing problems 
exist between government agencies and private companies; investigates how PPPs satisfy 
national cybersecurity needs; and, in turn, reveals issues for policymakers to consider 
when shaping policies that encourage an open dialog between the public and private 
sector. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Cyber threats make the headlines daily, from attacks on critical infrastructure to 
personal identity theft. Government agencies, businesses, and individuals alike have 
become more dependent on technology, and the desire and need for interconnectedness 
has led to increasing network vulnerability affecting both government and private sectors. 
Policymakers and cyber experts continue to push for legislation that encourages private 
companies to participate voluntarily in information sharing programs to better guard 
against cybercrime and espionage. Recognizing both government and private sectors 
alone lack the capabilities to defend against cyber threats,1 President Obama, under 
Executive Order 13636 and Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 21, directed several 
government agencies, with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) taking the lead, 
to establish a more robust and resilient cybersecurity alliance that encourages 
information-sharing partnerships with private sector owners and operators in charge of 
protecting U.S. critical infrastructure (CI).  
Despite the recent drive for cyber legislation and policies, government agencies 
and private companies have seemed reluctant to disclose information related to cyber-
attacks and threats with one another. This thesis asks why do cybersecurity information-
sharing problems exist between the government and the private sector? In doing so, it 
also investigates how public-private partnerships (PPPs) respond to these problems to 
satisfy national cybersecurity needs; and reveals these underlying issues for policymakers 
to consider when shaping policies that encourage an open dialog between the public and 
private sector. 
                                                 
1 “Fact Sheet: Executive Order 13636 and Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-21,” Department of 
Homeland Security, March 2013, http://www.dhs.gov/publication/fact-sheet-eo-13636-improving-critical-
infrastructure-cybersecurity-and-ppd-21-critical. 
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B. IMPORTANCE OF RESEARCH 
Efforts to foster and increase information sharing have recently emerged from 
both the government and private sectors. Two examples that emanated from EO 13636 
are the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) Framework version 1.0 
(shaped by both private industry and government),2 and the Department of Homeland 
Security’s (DHS) Critical Infrastructure Cyber Community Volunteer Program (C3VP).3 
The Framework promises to improve resiliency and encourage discussion of best 
practices for managing cybersecurity risk; CV3P encourages private businesses to adopt 
the Cybersecurity Framework. However, both programs–—still in their infancy—–are 
voluntary; there is much debate over whether such programs will be effective; for 
example, some have critiqued how the language in the EO only specifies the directional 
flow of information from the private sector to government agencies.4 
Cybersecurity experts, lobbyists, and sector-specific agencies (SSAs) of critical 
infrastructure argue the need for better legislation and guidance that not only facilitates 
collaboration from both private and government agencies, but also provides liability 
protection against litigation for disclosure while sharing information and responding to 
cyber-threats.5 For example, the Department of Treasury (SSA in charge of protecting the 
financial services sector) recognized the need for more public-private collaboration in 
improving cybersecurity to the U.S. financial sector—listed as one of four strategic 
                                                 
2 “Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity: Version 1.0,” National Institute 
Standards and Technology, February 12, 2014, http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/upload/ cybersecurity-
framework-021214.pdf. 
3 “Critical Infrastructure Cyber Community Voluntary Program,” United States Computer Emergency 
Readiness Team, Department of Homeland Security, accessed May 27, 2014, http://www.us-cert.gov/ 
ccubedvp. 
4 Veronica A. Chinn, Furches, Lee T., and Woodward, Barian A., “Information- Sharing with the 
Private Sector,” National Defense University Press, April 1, 2014, http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/ 
NewsArticleView/tabid/7849/Article/8464/jfq-73-information-sharing-with-the-private-sector.aspx. 
5 Ryan Tracy, “Cybersecurity Legislation Gets Push From Financial Firms,” The Wall Street Journal, 
Law Blog, November 13, 2013, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2013/11/13/cybersecurity-legislation-gets-push-
from-financial-firms/. 
 3
objectives in safeguarding the financial system against cybersecurity threats in the 
department’s Strategic Plan FY 2014–2017.6 
Current literature on cyber information sharing focuses on endorsing 
cybersecurity legislation, policies, and laws that encourage or even mandate government-
private sector partnerships. Some argue that government declassification and disclosure 
of known cyber threats to private companies is the answer,7 while others argue that the 
answer rests in the private sector sharing timely cyber threat information with 
government agencies.8 Despite these conventional arguments, the bulk of current 
literature lacks discussion of other possibilities. A more focused approach that examines 
similar public-private relationships within individual CI sectors could reveal further 
motivations or explanations that could add value to the existing body of knowledge on 
cybersecurity issues between the government and private sector. This thesis attempts to 
discover the deeper underlying issues that inhibit public-private cooperation. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The concept of public-private partnerships (PPP) dates back to the Colonial 
period in North America when John Winthrop, Jr. established a series of pharmaceutical 
laboratories, which led to the idea that government agencies could utilize private 
businesses to not only advance the progress of science, but also benefit society.9 PPPs—
situations in which government agencies interact with private companies—are unique to 
other government-private associations in that they both share in the resources, risks, and 
                                                 
6 Department of Treasury, Department of the Treasury FY 2014–2017 Strategic Plan, 32, 
http://www.treasury.gov/about/budget-performance/strategic-plan/Documents/2014–2017US_ 
TreasuryStrategicPlan.pdf. 
7 Kelly Riddell, “Ex-FBI Official: Intel Agencies Don’t Share Cyber threats that Endanger 
Companies,” The Washington Times, May 11, 2014, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/ 
may/11/intel-agencies-dont-share-cyber-threats-that-could/?page=all. 
8 James B. Comey, “The FBI and the Private Sector: Closing the Gap in Cyber Security,” Speech, 
February 26, 2014, http://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/the-fbi-and-the-private-sector-closing-the-gap-in-
cyber-security. 
9 Thomas Cellucci, “Innovative Public-Private Partnerships: Pathway to Effectively Solving 
Problems,” Department of Homeland Security, July 2010, 4, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/st_ 
innovative_public_private_partnerships_0710_version_2.pdf. 
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costs of delivering a service to the public.10 A more complete definition of PPPs is 
provided in Chapter III: Public-Private Partnerships in Cybersecurity. Today, many, 
particularly in the Executive Branch, still believe in that same concept and submit that 
fostering an information sharing alliance between government agencies and private 
businesses that share in both costs and benefits is the best course of action to defend 
against cyber-related attacks.   
To understand the significance of the lack of cybersecurity information sharing 
between public and private entities, it is necessary to find a place in time when 
cybersecurity became a major issue. The prevailing literature on cybersecurity tends to 
emerge around 2006 as the landmark year when we begin to see a significant rise in cyber 
incidents.11 This steep upsurge in cyber-related attacks and threats highlighted the need 
for immediate cybersecurity reform. Recognizing that the private sector controls the 
majority of our nation’s critical infrastructure, the president released Executive Order 
13636 in an effort to streamline cybersecurity regulations across both public and private 
agencies to foster a more resilient cyber defense.12 
Over the past several years (before and after the release of EO 13636), 
government officials and private sector leaders alike have pressed for more public-private 
collaboration to increase cybersecurity across all sixteen sectors of CI. Despite this 
widespread urgency, policymakers have found difficulty in drafting legislation that not 
only protects our national infrastructure, but also balances security and privacy.13 The 
concept of cooperation between government agencies and the private sector continues to 
be a controversial issue. 
                                                 
10 Cellucci, “Innovative Public-Private Partnerships,” 4. 
11 “Significant Cyber Events,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, last modified March 10, 
2014, http://csis.org/files/publication/140310_Significant_Cyber_Incidents_Since_2006.pdf. 
12 Executive Order no. 13636, Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, DCPD-2013000 91, 
February 19, 2013, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013–02–19/pdf/2013–03915.pdf. 
13 Chertoff group has noted in a recent Cybersecurity Presentation, “Over 50 different pieces of 
Legislation introduced in the past two years.” Ben Beeson, Gerald Ferguson, and Mark Weatherford, 
“Implementation of the Cybersecurity Executive Order,” slide 6, November 13, 2013, 
http://chertoffgroup.com/events.php.  
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In 2010, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report 
upon Congressional request to determine cyber-related PPP expectations from the 
stakeholder’s perspective—and to evaluate the degree those expectations were being 
satisfied. Utilizing both public and private employees, the GAO distributed surveys, 
conducted interviews, and analyzed relevant policies across five CI sectors that rely 
heavily on cyber assets to support operations: Communications, Defense Industry Base, 
Energy, Banking and Finance, and Information Technology.14 In 2012, the White House 
released Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-21), which identified and established 16 
separate critical infrastructure sectors.15 Further discussion of PPD-21 is provided in 
Chapter II. 
The GAO found that private sector expectations, such as timely sharing of cyber-
related threats from the federal government and granting of security clearances, fell short. 
Less than one-third of those surveyed reported receiving usable threat information.16 The 
report also found that government expectations, such as implementing government 
recommendations and sensitive information sharing, were also unsatisfactory. For 
example, some private stakeholders refused to share sensitive information due to 
government distrust.17 Although the GAO identifies several inadequacies of 
cybersecurity PPPs, the report makes only two recommendations: Utilize results to 
improve on expectations and augment a central point for better information integration.18 
These recommendations lack any real plan of action or guidance for policymakers. 
Another issue is the scope of the GAO’s research, which compared the effectiveness of 
cybersecurity of five complex CI sectors. While the report’s initial findings seem 
beneficial to improving PPP’s within those sectors, such findings cannot be assumed 
across all sectors of CI. A more focused approach that compares only two or three similar 
                                                 
14 David A. Powner, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Key Private and Public Cyber Expectations 
Need to be Consistently Addressed, United States Government Accountability Office, 2010, 7, 
http://search.proquest.com/ docview/831086945?accountid=12702. 
15 “Critical Infrastructure Sectors,” Department of Homeland Security. accessed December, 15 2014, 
http://www.dhs.gov/critical-infrastructure-sectors. 
16 Powner, Critical Infrastructure Protection, 16. 
17 Ibid., 22. 
18 Ibid., 23–24. 
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sectors could yield additional answers, produce more accurate and timely results, and 
utilize fewer resources. Regardless of the report’s findings, it does reveal some initial 
issues facing PPPs and establishes the reference point for further research in answering 
why a problem exists between government agencies and private companies in sharing 
cyber-related threat information. 
Perhaps the most thorough and recent scholarly work on the topic of cybersecurity 
information sharing is Forrest Hare’s Dissertation on The Interdependent Nature of 
National Cyber Security. He argues the need for cyber related information sharing 
between both government and private agencies and analyzes the electric power sector’s 
motivations for information sharing as the United States looks to start using new 
technologies, such as the Smart Grid.19 Hare also stresses the importance of the private 
sector’s investment in cybersecurity and contribution to public-private information 
sharing in order to strengthen cyber defenses and increase response time to threats and 
incidents.20 Hare’s research findings identify several barriers and disincentives of 
information sharing between government and private agencies within the electric power 
sector.21 He also found that additional government regulation over cybersecurity does not 
pose a negative impact on private sector motivations; however, he discovered that 
increased regulation would result in a “greater reporting burden and fewer resources 
devoted to actually improving [cyber] security.”22 Hare further adds that companies 
might be more willing to invest in more cybersecurity measures if other private sector 
companies incurred the same costs. 
Hare asks two questions. First, in the interest of national security and absent 
government regulation, what motivations exist that encourage private firms to invest in 
cybersecurity procedures?23 Second, how can public-private information sharing offer 
                                                 
19 Forrest B. Hare, “The Interdependent Nature of National Cyber Security: Motivating Private Action 
for a Public Good” (PhD diss., George Mason University, 2010), 155, Dudley Knox Inter Library Loan: 
129484. 
20 Ibid., 184. 
21 Ibid., 205–6. 
22 Ibid., 214. 
23 Ibid., 93. 
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utility to both parties within the electric power critical infrastructure sector?24 He also 
identifies and attempts to prove multiple hypotheses centered on the electric power CI 
sector. While Hare’s work does not evaluate the effectiveness of cybersecurity 
information sharing between government and private-sector agencies, it does identify the 
potential of public-private partnerships to directly improve trust and motivation to 
cooperate while indirectly increasing interaction between both sides.25 He concludes that, 
“the private sector needs to have a better understanding of how their actions and inactions 
are directly related to nation security,” further suggesting that additional research that 
focuses on such factors could aid cybersecurity experts across all sectors of Critical 
Infrastructure.26 Hare’s extensive research establishes a baseline of knowledge upon 
which this thesis will attempt to build.  
In 2011, five leading cybersecurity associations released a white paper 
highlighting several cybersecurity achievements resulting from public-private 
partnerships. The authors base their research on President Obama’s 2009 Cyberspace 
Policy Review (CSPR) and the 2009 National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). The 
paper identifies seven key areas of cybersecurity that align with the CSPR, including risk 
management; information sharing and privacy; and education and awareness. The paper 
also offers several recommendations to include calling for more transparency and sharing 
of secret information from the government, and for Congress to amend current 
surveillance laws tailored for cybersecurity.27 It also suggests that both government and 
private agencies develop incentives that encourage voluntary adoption and investment of 
best security practices and technology within the guidelines of the NIPP framework.28 
Additionally, the paper proposes greater cybersecurity education and awareness training, 
                                                 
24 Hare, “The Interdependent Nature,” 185. 
25 Ibid., 222–23. 
26 Ibid., 256. 
27 Business Software Alliance, et al., “Improving our Nation’s Cybersecurity Through the Public-
Private Partnership: White Paper,” March 8, 2011, 17, https://cdt.org/files/pdfs/20110308_cbyersec_ 
paper.pdf. 
28 Ibid., 12. 
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to include hiring more cyber experts in both public and private agencies.29 While these 
recommendations are plausible, they are repetitive of past research findings. Moreover, 
the paper lacks any discourse to answering why government agencies and private 
companies seem reluctant to disclose information related to cybersecurity.  
One year prior to the release of EO 13636, the United States experienced its 
largest increase ever in cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure. Although the details 
behind the sudden hike in cyber awareness were unclear, there were several contributing 
factors, such as an increase in technology, a surge in sophisticated hackers, and an 
escalation in probing from other non-allied countries such as Russia and China. 30 James 
Lewis, Senior Fellow from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 
noted, “We hit rock bottom on [cybersecurity] in 2010. Then we hit rock bottom in 2011. 
And we are still at rock bottom,” indicating that the United States is becoming 
increasingly vulnerable to cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure.31  
The beginning of 2012 brought light to the problem of government’s (particularly 
the Department of Homeland Security’s) role in encouraging the private sector to invest 
in a more robust network security. As cyber-related attacks continued to increase, cyber 
experts and government officials (including the president) began to push for legislation 
that not only grants the federal government the authority to begin sharing information 
with the private sector, but also establishes minimum cybersecurity standards that private 
companies in charge of operating and protecting critical infrastructure would be required 
to achieve.32 John Brennan, who was then President Obama’s senior adviser on 
counterterrorism and homeland security, strongly urged for a more mandated 
cybersecurity policy versus a voluntary system, and was a large supporter of the proposed 
Cybersecurity Act of 2012. He highlights how the private sector and government 
                                                 
29 Business Software Alliance, et al., “Improving our Nation’s Cybersecurity,” 25. 
30 Michael Schmidt, “New Interest in Hacking as Threat to Security,” The New York Times, March 13, 
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/14/us/new-interest-in-hacking-as-threat-to-us-security.html?_ r=0. 
31 Ibid. 




agencies in the past have teamed up to protect critical infrastructure from physical threats, 
adding “There is no reason we cannot work together in the same way to protect the 
cybersystems of our critical infrastructure.”33 
President Obama also wrote an op-ed identifying the security gaps that exist from 
companies that have not adopted more robust cyber defenses. He stressed the necessity 
for a set of cybersecurity standards developed and executed by both private and 
government agencies that not only protects our national and economic security, but also 
protects the privacy and civil liberties of all Americans.34 Then-National Security 
Agency (NSA) and U.S. Cyber Command chief General Keith Alexander also voiced his 
concern over the increase of cyber-related attacks on U.S. Critical Infrastructure and 
urged for legislation that enables the government to defend private networks against 
cyber threats—despite deep concerns from private businesses and civil liberty groups 
over rising costs on network regulation and privacy issues.35 These views continue to 
highlight that the drive toward a more secure network that protects critical infrastructure 
lacks due regard for potential public-private information sharing problems. 
While many have argued that PPP’s are needed to protect our Nation’s Critical 
Infrastructure Key Resources (CIKR) against cyber-attacks and threats, there are those 
who have critiqued the Executive’s approach to regulating cybersecurity of private 
industry networks. The year 2012 became a controversial year for cybersecurity 
legislation, with experts and politicians battling both sides of the argument of 
empowering DHS to regulate cybersecurity.36 Prior to the release of EO 13636, three 
senators (John McCain R-AZ, Kay Hutchison R-TX, and Saxby Chambliss R-GA) 
expressed their opinion of how the Executive Branch’s mandate actually hurts the 
                                                 
33 Brennan, “Time to Protect.” 
34 Barack Obama, “Taking the Cyberattack Threat Seriously,” The Wall Street Journal, July 19, 2012, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10000872396390444330904577535492693 044650. 
35 David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, “Rise is Seen in Cyberattacks Targeting U.S. Infrastructure,” The 
New York Times, July 26, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/27/us/ cyberattacks-are-up-national-
security-chief-says.html. 
36 Ellen Nakashima, “On Cybersecurity Bill, Battle Lines Forming,” The Washington Post, February 
17, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/checkpoint-washington/post/ divisions-erupt-over-
cybersecurity-bill/2012/02/17/gIQAG348IR_blog.html. 
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potential for public-private partnerships. They cited antitrust laws and statutory 
limitations as the legal hurdles discouraging private companies from collaborating in 
cyber-threat sharing activities with government agencies, stressing that “companies must 
first check with their lawyers before sharing information for fear of litigation, not just 
from customers or shareholders but from federal and state governments as well.”37 In 
rebuttal, they urged the president to release a bipartisan information-sharing bill that 
grants clear authority to share cyber-threat information between government entities and 
private companies that includes liability protections in lieu of EO 13636.38 The three 
senators, who were ranking Republicans on the Armed Services Committee, also stated 
that “new statutory protections would drive information sharing and significantly 
improve our nation’s cybersecurity,” and strongly felt that such protections would 
unnecessarily amend existing law. At the time, they believed that the executive order by 
itself would not be enough to foster a government-private cybersecurity alliance. 
While policymakers, cyber experts, and the media debated over cybersecurity 
legislation and privacy concerns, the impact of PPPs on homeland security issues 
received little attention. Recognizing the lack of scholarly literature on PPPs and 
protecting CI from all hazards, including cyber-related threats, Nathan Busch and Austen 
Givens attempted to fill this gap by presenting their research in an October 2012 edition 
of Homeland Security Affairs. Their work focuses on examining the evolving role of 
PPPs and discusses the benefits, limitations, challenges, and incentives that PPPs face in 
protecting the nation from all threats. Because 85% of our nation’s CI is under private 
sector control, the authors stress the need for an alliance between DHS and private sector 
companies.39 While only a limited section is dedicated to cybersecurity, the research 
overall is applicable to all sectors of critical infrastructure.  
                                                 
37 John McCain, Kay Hutchison, and Saxby Chambliss, “No Cybersecurity Executive Order, Please,” 
The Wall Street Journal, Sept 4, 2012, http://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/ index.cfm/opinion-
editorials?ID=c5083e37–061e-ac3f-8e9b-2594e43f9d2c. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Nathan E. Busch and Austen D. Givens, "Public-Private Partnerships in Homeland Security: 
Opportunities and Challenges," Homeland Security Affairs 8, no. 1 (2012) 3, http://search.proquest.com/ 
docview/1266365905?accountid=12702. 
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Although the authors highlight the many benefits to PPPs, including building trust 
and technological innovation, they also address what the previous literature on PPPs 
seems to lack: potential limitations and challenges. For example, one limitation the 
authors discuss is how poor management within PPPs can lead to rising costs and failed 
expectations, such as the Virtual Fence project that DHS ultimately cancelled.40 Another 
limitation that previous literature misses is the appearance versus reality problem of 
PPPs. While businesses may publicly appear to place security as a top priority, secretly, 
they are more concerned about their bottom line. Private organizations may also appear to 
share mutual security standards set by the government; however, in reality corporations 
are more likely to avoid complying with costly security recommendations. Thus, the 
appearance of public-private cooperation concerning cybersecurity is often less of a 
reality.41 The authors also identify another pitfall to government-private sector 
collaboration in their critique of the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council 
(CIPAC)—an organization within DHS comprised of both government and private 
businesses that share information to protect CI at the federal level. Despite the council’s 
many contributions to PPPs, some view CIPACs position as “overly government-centric” 
by siding with the government over private industry concerns.42 As a result, some private 
firms may become discouraged if they share information with government agencies but 
those agencies do not reciprocate in a timely fashion. Busch and Givens conclude that 
although PPPs within homeland security endure significant challenges and limitations, 
“future studies will need to examine other critical issues that become relevant as [PPPs] 
continue.”43 The authors’ findings helps establish a baseline of knowledge in 
government-private sector information sharing issues in which this thesis will attempt to 
expand upon by exploring current barriers to collaboration within a single CI sector.  
The most recent work to date that attempts to assess the status quo of public-
private partnerships in securing cyberspace is a comparative analysis conducted by 
                                                 
40Busch and Givens, "Public-Private Partnerships,”  9. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., 4. 
43 Ibid., 15. 
 12
Rachel Nyswander Thomas, Vice President of Government Affairs for the Direct 
Marketing Association,44 and published by CSIS. She examined the current (2012) status 
of cybersecurity PPPs by analyzing several partnership models and offered a few 
alternatives for policymakers to consider in meeting the nation’s cybersecurity 
expectations.45 Her research sought to determine the PPP model most suitable in helping 
secure cyberspace. By analyzing preceding cybersecurity PPPs, Thomas discovered that 
pressure, coupled with a sense of urgency, is what forced many government and private 
sector agencies to collaborate rather than using a more systematic approach; based on this 
finding, she concluded that the field of cybersecurity was mature enough to begin 
comparing different cybersecurity PPP models.46 Out of four alternate models, only one 
met the set criteria determined to provide a more secure cyberspace: a civic switchboard 
that coordinates public-private cyber information sharing under the direct authority of the 
Executive Office.47 Thomas also found that despite the requirement of an ISAC for every 
CI sector under Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 63, several CI sectors lack an 
Information Sharing Analysis Center (ISAC) counterpart—partly due to disagreements 
between industry leaders as to the necessity of an ISAC investment.48 One could argue 
that sectors lacking an ISAC hinder information sharing between government agencies 
and industry; yet, her research does not fully investigate this issue. While Thomas’ 
contribution helps reinforce the status quo reiterated in previous literature that PPPs 
remain an integral piece of the cybersecurity puzzle, her research contains one particular 
weakness—source attribution. 
Although her report was initially published in May 2012, Thomas updated it in 
August 2013. However, the updated report lacks an explanation of the content added or 
changed—including the extent of change—leaving it up to the reader to hunt for the 
                                                 
44“Rachel Nyswander Thomas,” bio, Direct Marketing Association website, http://thedma.org/ 
dma/rachel-nyswander-thomas/. 
45 Rachel Nyswander Thomas, “Securing Cyberspace Through Public-Private Partnership: A 
Comparative Analysis of Partnership Models,” May 2012, 8, Last updated August 2013 http://csis.org/ 
files/publication/130819_ tech_summary.pdf. 
46 Ibid., 31. 
47 Ibid., 53. 
48 Ibid., 9, 28. 
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changes using footnotes. More importantly, the facts derived from the personal 
interviews Thomas conducted over the course of her research might be the most 
important contribution to the existing literature on PPPs in securing cyberspace; yet, 
those sources remain anonymous in the report, which makes assessing the credibility of 
these sources difficult—if not impossible. For example, Thomas states, “only 200 people 
in the entire financial services sector have a clearance level that would enable them to 
receive classified information directly from ISAC partners.”49 While this information 
helps address the issue of the government providing timely security clearances to private-
sector owners of CI, the source remains nameless. Similar research that acknowledges 
reputable sources could yield a more practical and plausible contribution to the existing 
body of knowledge on cybersecurity PPPs. 
Despite an enormous hike in cyber-related attacks, literature concerning 
cybersecurity and PPPs began to decline in 2013. While journalists, cybersecurity 
experts, and policymakers stressed the importance of government-private sector 
collaboration on cybersecurity efforts, scholarly research on the effectiveness of PPPs 
took a back seat. Days after the release of the EO 13636, FBI Director Robert Mueller 
stressed the importance of information sharing between the Bureau and other government 
agencies—to include the private sector. He believed the problem was the lack of urgency 
in private companies to recognize the seriousness of cyber-related threats. Mueller cited 
several successful examples of PPP models, including the National Cyber Forensics and 
Training Alliance (collaboration of law enforcement and private industry); Enduring 
Security Framework (group of private and government leaders that analyze cyber-related 
threats); and the FBI’s own Domestic Security Alliance Council (consisting of security 
representatives from all CI and business sectors).50 These models could serve as potential 
case studies in helping solve the cybersecurity information-sharing problem. Both the 
NCFTA and ESF are discussed in Chapter III, Section D: Cybersecurity PPPs in Action. 
                                                 
49 Thomas, “Securing Cyberspace ,” 12. 




Within a month of the president’s Executive Order, media outlets began reporting 
that security companies, such as Raytheon and Lockheed Martin, were lobbying for 
stronger cyber laws that mandated more stringent cybersecurity requirements, in order to 
boost sales in security products. Meanwhile, the victims of cyber-attacks—banking, 
communication, and energy sectors—pushed for better liability protection and threat 
assessments from government agencies.51 The majority of cybersecurity publicity during 
2013 consisted of continual recommendations on policy and ways to increase cyber 
defenses with very little research into the effectiveness of PPPs. However, retired Rear 
Admiral and current Cybersecurity Solutions Group Vice President Elizabeth A. Hight 
cited one particular case where the Department of Energy (DOE) and DHS formed an 
information-sharing alliance with several different energy companies—highlighting the 
potential value in using mature partnership models as benchmarks that can measure 
forward progress in cybersecurity. Hight noted, “[w]hen industry and the public sector 
are able to access and receive timely, actionable information, better solutions emerge,” 
further arguing that such models establish a standard for other CI sectors to follow.52 
By now, it should be evident that, despite an obvious increase in cyber-related 
threats to our nation’s CI, government and private entities have been at times both willing 
and reluctant to forge PPPs that encourage information sharing to enhance cybersecurity. 
Absent from the current literature is a more focused analysis that examines whether or 
not similar CI specific agencies enjoy more or less cooperation on cybersecurity matters 
within their respective private industries. This research adds to the existing body of 
knowledge by exploring the current barriers to PPPs within the finance sector53 to help 
fill the gap between the government’s push to increase cyber resiliency and the seemingly 
                                                 
51 Eric Engleman and Jonathan D. Salant, “U.S. Cybersecurity Policy Draws Interest From 
Companies, Lobbyists,” The Washington Post, March 24, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/ 
economy/us-cybersecurity-policy-draws-interest-from-companies-lobbyists/2013/03/24/916a79f2–9271–
11e2-bdea-e32ad90da239_story.html. 
52 Elizabeth A. Hight, “Forging A Public-private Partnership for Cybersecurity: Government, Private 
Sector Collaboration Key to Forward-looking Security,” Washington Technology, April 30, 2013, 
http://washingtontechnology.com/articles/2013/04/30/insights-hight-cyber-collaboration.aspx. 
53 The financial sector was chosen due to the more recent surge in cyber-attacks on U.S. banks and 
citizens; the banking and finance sector also has the potential to suffer the most catastrophic damage to 
national security, U.S. economy, and lifestyle. 
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non-cooperation, perhaps even reluctance to cooperate, of both government agencies and 
privately owned businesses in charge of protecting our nation’s CI.  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Based on scholarly evidence presented in the literature review, there are three 
potential explanations for the failure of government and private sector cooperation in 
cybersecurity information-sharing. The author recognizes that, while the potential for 
other casual explanations or theories may exist, the three presented here are the most 
promising explanations to the complex question this thesis attempts to answer. 
Hypothesis One: Participation in PPPs is less likely to occur when either side fails 
to share cyber-related information in a timely and accurate 
manner. 
Hypothesis Two: Private companies feel threatened by cybersecurity regulations 
and standards that increase security costs, risk the loss of 
market share, and lack incentives, thus decreasing the 
likelihood of PPP participation. 
Hypothesis Three: Small-to-medium sized private sector companies lack the 
necessary resources to participate in information-sharing 
cybersecurity PPPs.  
E. METHODOLOGY 
For the purpose of this research, Public-Private Partnerships (by definition 
provided earlier in the literature review) refers to both government and private sector 
entities that share in the resources, risks, and costs of delivering a service to the public.54 
Thus, the government-private associations explored in this research are synonymous with 
PPPs. Further discussion of PPPs is also provided in Chapter III. To help identify the 
barriers to establishing PPPs, this thesis examines cybersecurity information-sharing 
within the banking and finance CI sector. The three proposed hypotheses described above 
                                                 
54 Cellucci, “Innovative Public-Private Partnerships,” 4. 
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will be tested based on the evidence provided in Chapters III and IV in an attempt to 
answer the major research question of why information-sharing problems exist between 
government agencies and private companies.  
For the purpose of this research, cyber-attacks involving major banks and 
corporations that affect the U.S. and world economy; personal identity theft that result in 
either potential or actual financial loss; and network breaches of major retail companies 
apply to the financial CI sector. While this thesis recognizes that other CI sectors share 
the same, if not more, dependency on cybersecurity alliances between government 
agencies and private sector companies, the finance sector has not only experienced a 
recent surge in cyber-attacks, but also have the potential to suffer the most catastrophic 
damage to our nation’s security, economy, and way of life. Additionally, private-sector 
owners control the majority of CI systems within these sectors—further stressing the 
importance of evaluating the factors that both promote and challenge cybersecurity PPPs.  
It is also important to note that while cyber-related incidents involving identity 
theft and breaches of major retail companies also fall under the IT sector, the majority of 
literature and evidence identifying the barriers to information-sharing between public and 
private entities is found within the banking and financial sector. However, in some 
instances, the lines between cybersecurity information sharing within some sectors can 
become blurred. For example, the FS and IT sectors; discussed in further detail in 
Chapter IV. 
F. OVERVIEW 
Chapter II provides a background of recent cyber-attacks across the various 
sectors of CI to establish the importance and urgency of the topic. This chapter also 
provides a brief description of the most recent controversial cybersecurity policies and 
legislation applicable to this research. Chapter III identifies several factors that both 
promote and challenge the establishment of, and agency participation in, cybersecurity 
PPPs. Chapter IV assesses the current challenges facing the establishment of PPPs to 
advance cyber information sharing within the banking and finance CI sector. Chapter V 
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provides a synopsis of the previous chapters, utilizes the case study findings to validate 
the three hypotheses, and offers recommendations for further research. 
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A. RISE OF CYBER-RELATED THREATS 
In a speech given at a cybersecurity conference in San Francisco, former FBI 
Director Robert Mueller said, “I am convinced that there are only two types of 
companies: those that have been hacked and those that will be,” further adding, “they are 
even converging into one category: companies that have been hacked and will be hacked 
again.”55 Government agencies, businesses, and individuals alike have become more 
dependent on technology, and the desire and need for interconnectedness has led to 
increasing network vulnerability in both government and private sectors—including our 
nation’s critical infrastructure. 
Despite tireless efforts to secure government and commercial networks; increase 
critical infrastructure resiliency; and protect intellectual property, cyber-related attacks 
continue to increase across the globe. Today, no state can claim to be impermeable to 
cyber-related threats. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) maintains 
an updated list of significant and successful cyber-attacks worldwide involving 
government agencies, the military, and the economy (where monetary loss exceeds one 
million dollars).56 It is important to note that this list only contains what CSIS considers 
to be substantial and does not account for all cyber-attacks or attempts. 
In the past decade, we have seen an increase of cyber-related attacks against U.S. 
networks and infrastructure. According to DHS, there were 50,000 cyber incidences 
reported between October 2011 and March 2012, which marked a historical increase in 
cyber-related attacks on multiple networks.57 In fact, in 2012 alone, DHS recorded over 
                                                 
55 Robert S. Mueller, “Remarks prepared for delivery,” RSA Cyber Security Conference, Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, March 1, 2012, http://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/combating-threats-in-the-cyber-
world-outsmarting-terrorists-hackers-and-spies. 
56 CSIS, “Significant Cyber Events.” 
57 Schmidt, “New Interest in Hacking.” 
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198 attacks against the United States.58  This sudden surge, coupled with a steady pattern 
of increasing vulnerability since 2010, created an overwhelming pressure on 
policymakers to pass legislation—granting the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
more oversight and regulation over the owners and operators of our Nation’s Critical 
Infrastructure. The increasing trend of significant global cyber incidents over a 7-year 
span (2006– 2013) is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.  Significant Cyber Incidents from 2006–201359 
From May 2006 to December 2013, according to CSIS, out of the 153 significant 
global cyber incidents (losses exceeding one million dollars), the United States alone 
experienced fifty-three—ranging from personal identity theft and cyber espionage, to the 
more recent Snowden leaks.60 While some attacks have left behind minimal damage, 
other more sophisticated attacks have resulted in major security breaches—resulting in 
the loss of hundreds of millions of dollars.61 The extent of damage caused by the 
Snowden leaks is still unknown. 
                                                 
58 Tiffany Kaiser, “DHS: Cyber Attacks Against US Infrastructure Increased by 52 Percent in 2012,” 
Daily Tech, January 10, 2013, http://www.dailytech.com/DHS+Cyber+Attacks+Against+US+ 
Infrastructure+Increased+ by+52+Percent+in+2012/article29632.htm. 
59 Data retrieved from CSIS, “Significant Cyber Events.” 
60 CSIS, “Significant Cyber Events.” 
61 Ibid. 
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B. POLICY AND LEGISLATION 
Creating a policy on which everyone can agree is virtually impossible. In fact, in 
1977, Congress introduced the Federal Computer Systems Protection Act, which 
attempted to establish penalties for computer crimes; unfortunately, the bill never passed. 
Throughout the next several years, federal agencies pressed policymakers to create laws 
against database breaches and a decade later, President Ronald Reagan signed the 
Computer Security Act of 1987, which intended to protect the databases of federal 
agencies against hacking. After the Morris worm attack of 1989 and continuous data theft 
in the early 1990s, it became obvious to policymakers that the Security Act of 1987 was 
failing.62 
Throughout the 1990s, fears of the Y2K bug began to spread. As a result, the 
Clinton administration established a Presidential Commission of Critical Infrastructure 
Protection (PCCIP) in the summer of 1996 that aimed to protect vital systems against 
potential cyber disruptions, be they terrorism, espionage, or network hacking. As Y2K 
approached, policymakers spent tens of billions on protecting against the anticipated 
global cyber crash. When the arrival of Y2K passed uneventfully, critics began to 
question why the U.S. had bought into the Y2K hype while other countries had not.63 
Since 2000, the amount of cyber incidents and policy initiatives has increased 
substantially—gaining massive attention from both public and private sector 
stakeholders. This accumulation of cyber-attacks not only reinforced the necessity for 
increased government oversight and tougher policies aimed to harden cyber structures, it 
also signaled a worldwide caution to all nations to take a hard look at reforming 
cybersecurity policy.64 
The United States has repeatedly struggled over the past several years to stay 
ahead of the opposition. In lieu of this battle, Congress and the president have passed, 
                                                 
62 “Government and Cybersecurity,” 1-2. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Andrea Peterson and Sean Pool, “Timeline: U.S. Security Policy in Context: A Look at President 
Obama’s Latest Executive Order and the Policies that Preceded It,” Science Progress, February 13, 2013, 
http://scienceprogress.org/2013/02/u-s-cybersecurity-policy-in-context/. 
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superseded, and abolished numerous cybersecurity policies; established U.S. Cyber 
Command (USCYBERCOM); formed the House Republican Cybersecurity Task Force; 
secretly released Presidential Policy Directive 20 (directive on cyber-attack defense); and 
released EO 13636 tasking NIST to develop a cybersecurity framework to assist owners 
and operators of CI to reduce cyber risks.65 Today, cybersecurity policies and programs 
designed to protect our networks, databases, and critical infrastructure are numerous; and 
the road to get here has not been easy. Protecting our national security against evolving 
cyber-threats has been an overwhelming task requiring countless changes and updates to 
cybersecurity policy. 
1. CISPA and CISA 
The most controversial bill on cybersecurity to date is the Cyber Intelligence 
Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA). In 2012, the House passed the bill despite heavy 
reproach from civil liberty organizations and critics who feared the bill would grant 
government and private agencies access to monitor individual online activity without 
oversight—so long as it was for cybersecurity purposes. CISPA came at a time when 
cyber-threats were on the rise and congress was receiving pressure from the financial 
sector and the White House to create legislation that encourages information sharing 
between government agencies and the private sector to prevent, mitigate, and respond to 
cyber-attacks. Supporters of the bill included tech companies IBM and Verizon; the 
financial institutions of Citibank and JPMorgan Chase; and the majority of House 
Republicans. Those opposed included the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU); the 
Congressional Privacy Caucus; and President Barack Obama who felt the bill lacked 
confidentiality and regulation. Not surprisingly, the bill never made it past the Senate.66 
One year later, the bill resurfaced for a second round in Congress with the same results; 
however, this time the Senate refused to even vote, stating that the Senate Intelligence 
                                                 
65 Peterson and Pool, “Timeline.” 
66 Keith Wagstaff, “The Breakdown: Who Supports CISPA and Who Doesn’t,” Time, April 30, 2012, 
http://techland.time.com/2012/04/30/the-breakdown-who-supports-cispa-and-who-doesnt/. 
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Committee was currently working on a similar bill.67 It was assumed that the next bill to 
replace the CISPA would be the NCCIP, until recently when Senators Dianne Feinstein 
(D-CA) and Saxby Chambliss (R-GA) revived a revised version of the CISPA bill for a 
third go-around. The new bill, the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2014 
(CISA), calls upon NIST to establish the same standards and practices they have already 
done in Framework 1.0. To better distinguish CISA between the two previous bills that 
created much controversy over privacy and civil rights violations, drops the “P” (for 
Protection).68 On April 18, 2014, CISA passed the House and, as the time of this 
research, was awaiting Senate approval. 
2. NCCIP 
With the recurring disappointment of CISPA over the past several years in 
Congress, Homeland Security Chair Michael McCaul (R-TX) and Bennie Thompson (D-
MS) vowed to develop an information-sharing bill that allows DHS to assist the private 
sector, charged with protecting Critical Infrastructure, in combating cyber-threats. The 
National Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Protection Act (NCCIP) of 2013, is not 
so much a Senate spinoff of CISPA as the current CISA bill, but rather the latest 
installment of information sharing legislation that amends the Homeland Security Act of 
2002. Cybersecurity expert Tom Kellermann strongly supports the bill and is very 
optimistic that it will pass later this year. He has over 17 years of experience in 
cybersecurity risk response, and recently served on the Cybersecurity Mission for the 
44th president.69 In a recent interview, Kellermann stressed the bill’s importance to the 
private sector and believed “it will act as a clearinghouse for cyber attacks and 
assistance,” further adding, “Other countries have been providing this type of support, but 
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this would be a first in the U.S.”70 Working closely with DHS, representatives from the 
House Homeland Security Committee have been hard at work to finalize the bipartisan 
supported bill that could not come at a more crucial time when frequent and almost daily 
reported cyber-attacks occur across all sectors of critical infrastructure.71 
3. EO 13636 
In February 2013, the White House released Executive Order 13636: Improving 
Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, due to the increasing potential of cyber-attacks that 
threaten our national security. The order establishes a standard for an information 
partnership between the private sector and government agencies on a voluntary basis. It 
calls on the Secretary of DHS, the director of DNI, the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST), and the Sector Specific Agencies (SSA), to establish a 
framework that improves resiliency and increases computer network security.72 The main 
issue with this order was that participation in an information-sharing coalition by private 
companies was voluntary. Because of this, the debate between privacy and protection 
emerged, and many private firms seemed reluctant to share such information with 
government agencies. In hopes of encouraging private sector participation, the Secretary 
of DHS was ordered to establish an incentive program.73 
4. PPD-21 
Released on the same day as EO 13636, the Presidential Policy Directive-21 was 
an overarching document addressing both physical and cyber threats against critical 
infrastructure; it replaced and updated the previous Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive-7 (HSPD-7). Similar to the requirements of EO 13636, the directive required 
the federal government to collaborate with state, local, tribal, and territorial agencies 
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(commonly referred to as SLTT), and the owners and operators in charge of critical 
infrastructure, to manage risks and increase resiliency against all hazards.74 PPD-21 also 
established and identified 16 separate critical infrastructure sectors, including the 
financial services sector.75 While EO 13636 focused exclusively on cyber-related threats 
by directing the Executive Branch to improve critical infrastructure cybersecurity, PPD-
21 addressed all threats and hazards to critical infrastructure security and resilience, and 
called for an updated National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP).76 Despite its 
positive contributions in protecting national security, some have criticized PPD-21 for 
being too broad. Forbes contributor and author of Surviving cyberwar, Richard Stiennon, 
believed PPD-21 expects too much and sets unrealistic deadlines of government agencies 
and SSAs. He called PPD-21 his “worst nightmare,” and a “top down solution that 
expresses the frustration of good intentions to ‘do something.’”77  
5. NIPP 
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) was an update to the previous 
NIPP as mandated by PPD-21. Drawing on lessons learned and experience gained since 
the previous NIPP, the new plan provided the framework for collective action across all 
CI sectors and all levels of government; incorporating both physical and cyber security 
elements, including the resilience of CI networks and assets, into one unity of effort 
aimed at increasing readiness and mitigating risk. The plan also established seven core 
tenants aimed to guide the entire CI community (national level down to the owner and 
operators) in the security planning process. Additionally, the NIPP introduced twelve 
Calls to Action intended to not only satisfy the goals of the plan, but to also guide all 
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departments and agencies in a strategic direction to improve security and resilience of the 
nation’s CI.78 
C. NIST RESPONSE TO EO REQUIREMENT 7 
After a year of hosting a series of workshops and revising multiple drafts, NIST 
released version 1.0 of its Cybersecurity Framework in February 2014. The framework 
was designed to be a cost-effective cyber-risk management tool allowing organizations to 
enhance critical infrastructure resiliency with minimal oversight from government 
agencies, and satisfied requirement seven of EO 13636.79 The framework contains 
industry standards and best practices for managing cybersecurity risk, including 
procedures for protecting individual privacy and civil liberties during cybersecurity 
activities.80 NIST’s framework is not static; it is, however, a living and breathing risk 
management tool—shaped by both public and private sectors. Although originally 
intended for owners and operators of CI, the framework’s application extends well 
beyond CI—aiding any corporation (large or small) in any industry, in identifying cyber-
risks and strengthening networks. While critics downplay the framework for its flaws and 
omissions, government agencies and businesses—small and large—are beginning to find 
utility in the framework.  
D. DHS RESPONSE TO EO REQUIREMENT 8 
In February 2014, DHS launched C3VP (commonly referred to as C-Cubed) to 
increase cybersecurity resiliency of critical infrastructure and to encourage use of the 
voluntary Framework. The C3VP program was designed to assist SSAs in using and 
implementing the Cybersecurity Framework and satisfied requirement eight of EO 
13636. The program is available in an unclassified, open-source forum that speaks to not 
only government and private agencies; it also offers academic, small business, and self-
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service tools aimed at educating as many organizations and people as possible. Although 
the voluntary program is still in its early stages, the primary focus for this first phase is to 
provide guidance for those SSAs currently utilizing the Framework. In future phases, 
DHS plans to expand the scope of the program to sectors of critical infrastructure willing 
to adopt the Framework.81 In a video teleconference at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, CA, Director John F. Murphy, DHS Office of Cyber and Infrastructure 
Analysis (OCIA), felt the program has been “beneficial” and “a big step forward” in 
building relationships between the private sector and DHS.82 
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III. PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN CYBERSECURITY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
DHS describes public-private partnerships as conditions in which government 
agencies interact with private companies; these relationships are unique to other 
government-private associations as they both share in the resources, risks, and costs of 
delivering a service to the public.83 The National Council for Public-Private Partnerships 
(NCPPP) defines public-private partnerships as: 
[A] contractual arrangement between a public agency (federal, state or 
local) and a private sector entity. Through this agreement, the skills and 
assets of each sector (public and private) are shared in delivering a service 
or facility for the use of the general public. In addition to the sharing of 
resources, each party shares in the risks and rewards potential in the 
delivery of the service and/or facility.84 
 As previously stated in the literature review, the concept of public-private 
partnerships is nothing new in the United States. PPPs can be traced back to the Colonial 
era in which the creation of a series of pharmaceutical laboratories led to government 
agencies utilizing private businesses to not only advance the progress of science but  
also benefit society.85 In today’s world of technology dependence and necessity for 
interconnectedness, many government and private sector entities believe that a 
cybersecurity information-sharing alliance between the government agencies and private 
businesses is the preeminent course of action to defend against cyber-related attacks. This 
chapter identifies and analyzes both factors that promote and challenge the establishment 
of information-sharing PPPs to defend against cyber-related threats. Identifying these 
factors not only provides the necessary evidence required to validate the three hypotheses 
proposed in Chapter I, but also helps identify why information-sharing barriers exist 
between government agencies and private companies. 
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B. FACTORS PROMOTING PPPS 
In 2002, the California Management Review featured an article that called into 
question management’s role in cybersecurity. While the authors argue that no 
organization can claim to enjoy perfect security, they do offer a few guidelines for those 
in the executive level of companies for consideration in minimizing risk while 
implementing a well-balanced and organized plan to combat cyber-threats. Despite being 
over a decade old, these findings still set a precedent that scholars and cyber experts have 
been stressing the importance of PPPs as both a tool and strategy to help combat 
cybersecurity issues between the public and private sector long before the recent surge of 
cyber-attacks.86 Although the report’s focus was mainly on management’s role in 
encouraging PPP participation to enhance cybersecurity, several benefits for utilizing 
PPPs aimed at securing vital networks of CI were identified. Certain costs are reduced 
when private companies express their views on the economic consequences of poor 
information security and when they agree to share their solutions to common security 
problems with government agencies. This not only establishes a reputation between 
private companies and government clients, it also improves private-government relations 
and allows both sides the opportunity to gain a better understanding of each other’s 
priorities and goals. Furthermore, participation in PPPs allows managers the opportunity 
to implement shared best practices and, more importantly, a voice in shaping policy in 
areas, such as the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and anti-trust laws—policies that 
play a major role in public-private sector relations.87 
Globalization and a rise in privatization of the public sector have resulted in many 
private companies assuming responsibility of Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP). 
This has created a challenge for both public and private sectors as government and 
private markets alone have become increasingly incapable of keeping up with cyber 
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threats and providing security for the majority of CI sectors.88 According to Myriam 
Dunn Cavelty and Manuel Suter, Center for Security Studies (CSS) in Zurich, 
Switzerland, cooperation between public and private entities in charge of CIP is essential. 
Cavelty adds that PPPs “have become the preferred solution in the field of CIP.”89 They 
give a lot of credit to the formation of sector-specific ISACs within the United States—an 
answer to Clinton’s Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 63. Although much work still 
lies ahead in improving how ISACs work horizontally (with other ISACs), the authors 
note that since 1999—the creation of the Financial Services ISAC (FS-ISAC)—ISACs 
have been performing as successful examples of cybersecurity information-sharing PPPs. 
Furthermore, many foreign governments have also seen success in creating similar PPPs 
that enjoy information-sharing between government and private industry designed to 
protect CI.90 Further discussion of the FS-ISAC, including its contribution to 
cybersecurity information sharing, is found in Chapter IV. While Cavelty and Suter 
reiterate the utility and necessity of information-sharing PPPs outlined in President Bill 
Clinton’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP)—which, among 
other tasks, called for the integration of private owners and operators of CI to help shape 
security policy—the majority of their work is based on identifying limitations to PPPs of 
CIP; therefore, those findings are discussed in the next section (Challenges and 
Limitations).91 
Although this research focuses on information-sharing alliances that help protect 
CI from cyber threats, it is important to recognize the utility of PPPs in increasing 
resilience during and after natural or manmade disasters—regardless of whether those 
disasters or events involve the use of cyber. Several benefits of PPPs formed to protect CI 
during times of disaster and recovery can be valuable in combating other types of threats, 
such as cyber-attacks. A study in 2009, conducted by the National Incident Management 
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Systems and Advanced Technologies Institute, identified several benefits and challenges 
in using PPPs to enhance resiliency during post-disaster response and recovery. The 
authors examine how resilience and PPPs can align to enhance disaster recovery and, in 
turn, recommend a framework that incorporates mutually supporting entities, such as 
PPPs, local communities, and critical infrastructure key resources (CI/KR).92 The study 
found that PPPs create unique opportunities to increase resilience during the response and 
recovery phases by enabling decision makers the ability to identify and focus the 
capabilities of both public and private entities where they are best needed.93 Other 
benefits include reducing certain limitations, such as trust, commonly associated with 
public-private collaboration by establishing guidelines that increase transparency and 
ensure accountability across the board.94 Trust between government and private firms 
wishing to share information about cyber threats have become a major and more recent 
concern. When stressful events occur, such as major disaster or cyber-attacks, trust 
between both public and private sectors is paramount. 
The most prominent benefits of establishing PPPs can be found in a report 
published by DHS in the summer of 2010. The report identified three major benefits in 
utilizing PPPs in general: First, PPPs increase efficiency in completing tasks and 
requirements; second, they significantly reduce taxpayer spending; third, they improve 
regulation compliance and increase service quality.95 DHS Chief Commercialization 
Officer Tom Cellucci believes that the PPP model is being used to “make positive 
changes in the way government and industry can work together” in solving homeland 
security needs.96 While the report does not focus on cybersecurity specifically and bases 
its findings primarily from commercialized-based PPPs, it does produce several 
worthwhile benefits for policymakers to consider in fostering PPPs for cybersecurity 
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information-sharing. Citizens (or taxpayers) benefit from better protection and less 
taxation; government agencies develop a better understanding of private sector needs and 
use less public resources; and private companies become better positioned to support 
public interests with its capabilities, ultimately contributing to the nation’s security. DHS 
contends that PPPs produce a win-win-win scenario for all parties involved.97 Former 
DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff also believes that PPPs are a better fit than simply 
allowing the government to prescribe cybersecurity policy to private companies. Chertoff 
believes that employing PPPs in cybersecurity would allow information to flow in both 
directions with the government offering research and intelligence, while the private sector 
reciprocating with educating government agencies on data mining and analysis it 
collects.98  
Neustar—a private corporation that analyzes real-time data within the Internet and 
telecommunications industries—praised the U.S. government’s effort in facilitating the 
establishment of PPPs to meet the nation’s challenges in cybersecurity. At a recent forum 
hosted by the Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC), Neustar’s Chief Technology Officer Mark 
Bregman commended the government’s efforts to bring both public and private sectors 
together to meet cybersecurity challenges to the nation’s economy and national security. 
Neustar is a member of the Executive Branch’s National Security Telecommunications 
Advisory Committee (NSTAC) and the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) 
Communications, Security, Reliability and Interoperability Council (CSRIC)—PPPs that 
work together to address cyber threats.99  
C. CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS 
While factors that promote the use of PPPs in cybersecurity are numerous, there 
are also several challenges and limitations to establishing and employing them to 
effectively counter cyber threats. Referring back to the findings in the 2002 California 
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Management Review that focused on management’s role in cybersecurity, the authors 
discuss the existence of hardships in forming PPPs—even over a decade ago. Despite the 
benefits realized from information-sharing PPPs, collaboration between two divergent 
sectors is neither an easy task—nor does it occur automatically.100 Perhaps the primary 
concern for stakeholders on both sides has been the ability to achieve and maintain trust 
between private sector companies and their government counterparts. Beyond the 
obstacle of attaining trust lies cooperation between both parties, which requires not only 
support from an appropriate number of personnel to satisfy requirements but also an 
adequate amount of funding and resources to accomplish agreed upon objectives—the 
latter being the most difficult to achieve due to shortages felt on both sides. Furthermore, 
information-sharing PPPs need proficient leaders capable of fusing the divergent and 
sometimes conflicting interests and cultures of both government agencies and private 
companies.101 The report also lists FOIA as another prohibiting factor to information-
sharing between the government and the private sector; however, since 2002 there have 
been several bills awaiting congressional approval that allegedly address the legal issues 
of private sector companies sharing information about cyber threats to the government. In 
his statement before the Committee on the Judiciary Senate, former Assistant Secretary  
for Policy for DHS, Paul Rosenzweig, stated that the proposed exemptions to the FOIA 
were “both wise and essential,” further expressing that “Current law[s] are, at best, 
ambiguous (and at worst prohibitory) and therefore impedes [sic] the creating and sharing 
of cyber threat and vulnerability information.”102 He, among others, believes that legal 
barriers to cybersecurity information-sharing PPPs are a primary concern of the majority 
of private-sector stakeholders. 
Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Manuel Suter’s extensive work in cybersecurity CIP 
also revealed several limitations in establishing and maintaining PPPs aimed at protecting 
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CI.103 First, they argue that the traditional PPP term is not applicable in the field of CIP 
since the majority of existing PPPs are project-based (designed to create efficiency) 
rather than time-based (aimed at building trust). Information-sharing between two diverse 
entities can only occur when mutual trust has been established, which requires a 
significant amount of time. Understanding this distinction, according to Cavelty and 
Suter, is necessary when thinking about PPPs in the field of CIP.104 Second, while the 
private sector owns and operates the majority of the nation’s CI, it is also increasingly 
finding itself in charge of protecting it. Since the fundamental duty of the state is 
protection of its citizens, delegating the task of security to the private sector raises some 
concerns over converging interests. While both public and private sectors share in the 
concern of disclosing information—government fears of unauthorized recipients gaining 
access to sensitive information and private sector fears of government security leaks—
their interests begin to diverge with the private sector becoming more concerned about 
business continuity than resolving state concerns over security issues. Furthermore, 
because the majority of private companies conduct their business abroad, they can only 
moderately enjoy the benefits of national collaboration.105 Third, and probably the 
biggest challenge to PPPs, is that most successful information-sharing exchanges occur 
inside much smaller circles, in which public and private agencies already enjoy some 
familiarity and degree of trust from previous relations. The underlying issue of 
information-sharing between public and private businesses is that in order to achieve 
trust, one needs collaboration; however, the success of that relationship relies heavily on 
trust. This is what the authors refer to as, the “classic assurance problem” or “‘chicken-
and-egg’ paradox.”106 Cavelty and Suter argue that forming new PPPs that share 
sensitive information is more difficult because it requires a high demand of mutual trust 
and are most likely doomed to fail in larger frameworks.107 
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In 2011, former DHS Deputy Secretary William Lynn III also believed that trust 
issues; legislation preventing information exchange; fear of client and stakeholder 
criticism; and inter-government agency conflicts were some of the top challenges facing 
the public-private sector collaboration in the cyber domain.108 A major limitation to 
information-sharing PPPs, such as ISACs, is that most are voluntary in nature; in other 
words, they can only share information they receive. While the U.S. government 
facilitates the organization of ISACs to collect, analyze, and disseminate cyber threat 
information, problems such as free-riding often result from inadequate incentives. 
Furthermore, not all ISACs share information with other ISACs, which greatly limits the 
distribution of critical threat information to other industries; thus, leaving ISAC databases 
unreliable and resulting in analysts producing incomplete results.109 
Manuel Suter, who is also affiliated with the International Cyber Center at George 
Mason University, held a cybersecurity workshop in Zurich, Switzerland, in the summer 
of 2010 where he discussed some of the challenges and best practices of cybersecurity 
PPPs aimed at protecting CI, and how to best manage those partnerships. Some of the 
major challenges facing cyber PPPs identified include: 
 Unclear delineation of roles and responsibilities 
 Lack of trust between partners 
 Diverging interests 
 Misplaced expectations110 
Suter also found that some private companies that become frustrated and have 
backed out of partnerships due specifically to the unwillingness of government actors to 
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reasonably cooperate. He concluded that while PPPs are vital in satisfying cybersecurity 
policies, they are difficult to establish.111 His findings echo a lot of the same major 
challenges to PPPs that have been highlighted throughout this chapter. 
D. CYBERSECURITY PPPS IN ACTION 
Perhaps the best approach for analyzing the effectiveness of PPPs is to examine a 
few, already-established, partnerships between the government and private business 
aimed at combating cyber-attacks and threats. As a result of the military’s overwhelming 
task of protecting cyberspace against intrusion, U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) 
was created in the summer of 2009 and became fully operational in late 2010. The 
consolidation comprised of the four service entities in charge of cyberwarfare (U.S. 
Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps) and is headed by one appointed service 
commander, Admiral Michael S. Rogers (at the time of this study).112 One of 
USCYBERCOMs missions is to partner with various government and non-government 
entities aimed at combating cyber threats, according to Deputy Defense Secretary 
William J. Lynn III.113 In 2010, as a part of the Pentagon’s Cyberstrategy, Lynn stressed 
the importance of USCYBERCOMs partnership with DHS and private enterprise in 
exchanging cyber-related threat information and managing mutual vulnerabilities. “The 
effort to defend the United States will only succeed if it is coordinated across the 
government, with allies, and with partners in the commercial sector,” argued Lynn.114  
Another PPP of interest is Enduring Security Framework—the collaboration of 
several major IT and defense companies, along with representatives from DHS, ODNI 
(Office of the Director of National Intelligence), and DOD—was launched toward the 
end of 2008.115 Top executives from the private sector are granted a one-day top secret 
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clearance and meet in Washington, DC, two to three times a year to discuss current cyber 
threats, capabilities, cyber weapons, and share in cybersecurity best practices. CEOs are 
then able to take this information back to their respective companies to protect their own 
networks against the latest cyber-attacks.116 The most recent meeting, held on September 
14, 2014, included a discussion on insider threats, DDoS, and destructive malware.117 At 
the time of his report, Lynn stressed the need for other agencies, such as The National 
Security Agency (NSA), to utilize their capabilities outside the government domain 
(.gov) to defend against critical network intrusions and cyber-attacks in commercialized 
domains (.com). “The best-laid plans for defending military networks will matter little if 
civilian infrastructure… is not secure,” argued Lynn.118 
The National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) is 
another public sector effort to encourage and establish cybersecurity PPPs. The NCCIC 
works with 18 separate private-sector industries to maintain an open dialog about 
cybersecurity threats and offers assistance when necessary; Facebook and Twitter were 
two recent examples.119 Homeland Security’s National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) 
has also worked with private groups to investigate cyber-attacks, such as the Stuxnet 
worm—which infected several critical networks in the countries of Iran and Indonesia—
and has facilitated cyber exercises, such as Cyber Storm III.120 More recent examples of 
private firms working with federal agencies to combat cyber incidents include Microsoft 
and a government CERT team—whose joint efforts were responsible for dismantling the 
Waledec botnet (a virus that infected Windows users worldwide); the NSA also assisted 
Google with an investigation into the Internet giant’s security breach.121 These are just a 
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few cases that not only illustrate the advantages of public-private collaboration, but also 
promote the use of PPPs in strengthening cybersecurity efforts. 
Between 2008 and 2011, the information-sharing efforts of the National Cyber 
Forensics and Training Alliance (NCFTA) resulted in hundreds of criminal investigations 
and prosecutions in cyber-related crimes.122 NCFTA—a non-profit corporation—is the 
only international cross-sector PPP model that unites over 500 subject matter experts 
(SME) from both public and private sectors worldwide; consisting of members from the 
FBI, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and Postal Inspection Service 
that collaborate with private industry, academia, and law enforcement to thwart cyber-
attacks and threats. Since its inception in 2002, the coalition’s focus has been to support 
the timely exchange of the most up-to-date cyber threats, including cyber-related crimes 
that occur within the IT and finance sectors, among others.123 
A more recent and successful PPP model comes from the development of NIST’s 
Cybersecurity Framework 1.0 (discussed in Chapter II). After a year of hosting a series of 
workshops and revising multiple drafts, NIST released version 1.0 of the framework—a 
structured roadmap designed to improve resiliency, increase computer network security, 
and encourage companies to discuss and evaluate best practices for managing 
cybersecurity risk.124 While the framework was initiated by the White House, it is far 
from any government-regulated standard. NIST “went to great lengths to collect, distill, 
and incorporate feedback from security professionals,” said Wyatt Kash of 
InformationWeek.125 He praised NIST for its public-private methodology of employing 
both public and private sector stakeholders into a PPP to develop the framework. “The 
framework has cred, as its recommendations come not from Washington regulators, but 
                                                 
122 Ron Plesco and Phyllis Schneck, "Criminal Public-Private Partnerships: Why can't we do that?" 
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs (Fall, 2011): 153, http://search.proquest.com/docview/ 
911784343?accountid=12702. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Executive Order no. 13636. 




from industry experts who’ve combatted cyberattacks,” added Kash.126 NIST executives 
state that their intention is to preserve the framework as a “living document,” and expects 
to receive continual updates and improvements “as industry provides feedback on 
implementation;” further claiming that “lessons learned will be integrated into future 
versions.” 127 From April 2013 to April 2014, NIST hosted five Framework Workshops 
and its first Private Engineering workshop to discuss development, solicit questions, and 
request feedback from industry, cybersecurity experts, and government agencies.128 
NIST recently conducted its second Privacy Engineering workshop in September 2014 
and its sixth Framework Workshop in October—its first gathering of industry 
stakeholders, academia, and the government since the framework’s debut. Stakeholders 
from both sides assessed industry use and awareness of the framework and addressed 
issues identified from industry feedback.129 NIST has been very aggressive in making 
steady improvements to the framework to ensure companies can adapt to evolving cyber 
threats; private sector owners and operators of CI—the framework’s end-users—have 
been the key component in providing recommendations to shape the framework. IBM 
Security Advisor, Diana Kelley, believes the “Framework can bring valuable guidance to 
all industries and organizations that depend on IT for their operations because it brings a 
common language and model to the process of managing cybersecurity risk.”130 Despite 
the framework’s infancy, it has made headlines. In the recent Heartbleed Saga—a newly 
discovered vulnerability in OpenSSL (Secure Socket layer) encryption software—
government agencies utilized the framework throughout the entire process from 
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identifying the threat to recovery.131 While private industry and government agencies 
seemed to lack common syntax, risk-management, and structure in cybersecurity, NISTs 
Framework seems to be filling that void and adding to the growing list of successful PPPs 
in cybersecurity. 
E. SUMMARY 
As economies, government agencies, businesses, and individuals continue to 
depend on the advances of technology for everything from banking and trading to 
communicating and shopping, cyber-attacks to U.S. critical infrastructure and national 
security are becoming more sophisticated and harder to defend. Unfortunately, this desire 
and need for interconnectedness has led to an increasing vulnerability in both government 
and private sectors. This chapter analyzed factors that promote and challenge the 
establishment of information-sharing PPPs to help defend against cyber-related threats. It 
also discussed current cybersecurity PPPs in action—such as Enduring Security 
Framework, the NCFTA, and the development of NIST’s Cybersecurity Framework 1.0. 
While the utility of PPPs in cybersecurity is steadily increasing, several challenges still 
remain. Three common barriers are lack of trust; legal concerns protecting private 
companies from litigation; and diverging interests and missed expectations between 
government and private companies. The conclusion of this chapter leads us to the major 
thesis question: if there are so many successful cases and incentives in utilizing PPPs to 
increase security and efficiency in both public and private sectors, then why is there an 
apparent failure of government and private sector cooperation in cybersecurity 
information-sharing? The following case study will address this problem by identifying 
the current issues surrounding this dilemma within the banking and finance CI sector. 
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IV. CASE STUDY: INFORMATION SHARING WITHIN THE 
BANKING AND FINANCE SECTOR 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter assesses the current challenges facing the establishment of PPPs to 
advance cyber information sharing within the banking and finance sector of U.S. Critical 
Infrastructure. For the purpose of this research (as mentioned earlier in Chapter I), the 
cyber-related attacks examined in this thesis are those involving major banks and 
corporations that affect the U.S. and world economy; personal identity theft that results in 
either potential or actual financial loss; and network breaches of major retail companies 
apply to the financial CI sector. While cyber-related incidents involving identity theft and 
breaches of major retail companies also fall under the IT sector, this thesis found that the 
majority of literature and evidence identifying the barriers to information-sharing 
between public and private entities exists within the banking and financial sector. 
To establish the necessity for both public and private sector collaboration in 
cybersecurity, this chapter first offers a brief background of the most prominent cyber-
attacks that have affected the finance sector—including threats originating from China 
and Iran, and the recent surge in identity theft—to help establish the urgency of why both 
public and private agencies need to establish cybersecurity information-sharing 
partnerships. Second, it offers a brief overview of the FS-ISAC and its contribution to 
cybersecurity information-sharing between the public and sector. Finally, this chapter 
identifies the more recent barriers to public-private cooperation in cybersecurity to help 
validate the three hypotheses introduced in Chapter I. These three explanations are 
validated in the final chapter. 
B. BACKGROUND 
In the summer of 2012, the Director of the National Security Agency (NSA), 
General Keith Alexander, announced that cyber-attacks on U.S. critical infrastructure 
companies had increased seventeen times between 2009 and 2011. He argued that attacks 
on our nation’s critical infrastructure are far more damaging than espionage and other 
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similar computer crimes. “On a scale of 1 to 10,” according to Alexander, “American 
preparedness for a large-scale cyber-attack is around a 3.”132 At the time of his statement, 
Congress was in the process of passing legislation that authorizes government agencies to 
intervene in defending the networks of the private companies that operate our nation’s 
infrastructure.133  
By ignoring multiple DDoS attacks on local websites only weeks prior to the 
Russian troop movement into South Ossetia in August 2008, the Georgian government 
allowed its cyber infrastructure to be shut down.134 Although forbidden by the Hague (V) 
Conventions of 1907, the Georgian government set up a temporary cyber-shop in three 
other countries, including the United States, in order to counter the Russian attack and 
protect its cyber infrastructure.135 U.S.-based servers, operated by TS Host, a multi-
million dollar company that provides secure servers for businesses, provided a safe 
location for the Georgian government to re-launch its more critical websites; however, 
neither TS Host nor the Georgian government received permission to do so.136 While the 
United States has authority under the Hague (V) Conventions of 1907to remain neutral137  
during a cyber-war carried out between two other combatant nations, this incident 
revealed that governments have minimal oversight on countries like Georgia that seek out 
private companies, seeded in U.S. territory, to render aid during a crisis like the Russian-
Georgia War.138 Although these cyber-attacks were specifically concentrated on 
Georgia’s government and economy, it validated not only Russia’s capability to conduct 
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such attacks, but alsoits will to utilize cyber warfare offensively. Today, policymakers 
face the challenge of preventing a repeat like Georgia’s demonstration of exploiting U.S. 
cyber assets to remain active during war, or much worse, directly attack U.S. banking and 
finance CI. The majority of cyber-related attacks on U.S. banking and finance have 
originated in the countries of China and Iran. For this reason, it is helpful to identify and 
discuss these occurrences below separately. Additionally, attacks involving identity theft 
and the 2014 surge in criminal cyber activity are also discussed. 
1. China 
In January 2010, a group of hackers from China infiltrated Morgan Stanley’s 
computer network, although no reports indicate the extent of damage caused by the 
network breach. Morgan Stanley’s cyber security firm was responsible for leaking the 
incident to the public. From March 2010 until April 2011, twenty separate illegal wire 
transfers occurred between several U.S. businesses and Chinese trade companies due to 
the compromise of online banking credentials. According to the FBI, the fraudulent 
transactions cost an estimated $11 million in individual losses—totaling $20 million 
overall. During a six-month network breach that began in October 2011, a hacker from 
China targeted the intellectual property of 48 chemical and defense companies, according 
to the virus-smashing firm Symantec. In December 2011, hackers from China penetrated 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce networks, which contained several communications on 
trade policy secrets between U.S. companies. Several media outlets linked the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) to the breach. News syndicates: The New York Times, Wall Street 
Journal, Washington Post, and Bloomberg News also attributed China to several cyber-
attacks in January 2013. What was most potentially damaging, although not specific to 
the finance and IT sectors, was the breach of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ network 
in May 2013, in which Chinese hackers gained direct access to the inventory and data of 
all U.S. dams.139 
                                                 
139 CSIS, “Significant Cyber Events.” 
 46
2. Iran 
Iran has also had its fair share of credit for cyber-attacks on the U.S. financial 
infrastructure. The most attributable Iranian-linked hacker group to date has been the 
Izzad-Din al-Qassam Cyber Fighters, which is also known for its ties to the terrorist 
group Hamas. The cyber-attacks from the group span between September 2012 and June 
2013. The most noteworthy of attacks began with the group’s launch of Operation 
Ababil, which involved a series of continuous Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) 
attacks aimed at the websites of several U.S. financial institutions in September 2012. 
One month later, reports indicated that six major U.S. banks fell victim to DDoS attacks. 
In January 2013, the group once again claimed ownership of similar DDoS attacks on the 
iconic financial institution, U.S. Bank. From March to June 2013, the group continued to 
target reputable U.S. financial institutions under Operation Ababil. During its twenty-one 
month cyber-wrath, the Cyber Fighters conducted three phases of DDoS attacks. Toward 
the close of the third phase, the group warned of a fourth; however, since that 
announcement, the group has been unnervingly silent.140 This has likely contributed to 
increased security measures taken by major U.S. financial institutions immediately 
following the group’s announcement.141 Despite the ominous silence from the Izzad-Din 
al-Qassam Cyber Fighters, other anonymous Iranian hackers have emerged, amassing 
their efforts to attack the wide spectrum of U.S. critical infrastructure.142 
3. Identity Theft 
Identity theft is a major and more recent area of concern in the cyber world. Gone 
are the days when simply covering up an ATM pin number, shredding bank statements, 
or even encrypting the network is adequate or acceptable. Criminals today are more 
sophisticated and efficient—using the very same technology we use and enjoy against us 
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to steal our identities and livelihood without ever knowing us or even leaving their living 
rooms. One cybercriminal that stands out is Albert Gonzalez who, up until the more 
recent Target and Sony hacks, pulled off the largest case of identity theft in U.S. history. 
Between 2006 and 2008, Gonzalez and a few Russian associates allegedly hacked over 
130 million credit card accounts via the websites of five major retailers. 143 
In December 2009, a group of hackers from China infiltrated the networks of 
search engine mogul Google, as well as the networks of some 30 other companies. 
According to Google, the hackers were successful in collecting valuable data, including 
gaining access to Google’s password management system and user e-mail accounts. 
Another noteworthy case involving the tech giant Google occurred in April 2011, in 
which Google announced that the Gmail account passwords of hundreds of distinguished 
individuals had been compromised by hackers in China using phishing scams. The 
following month, hackers infiltrated the popular Sony PlayStation network and stole the 
personal information of over 80 million clients—the breach cost Sony over $170 
million—although this incident has been overshadowed by the more recent Sony 
computer system breach and shutdown in late 2014.144  
Similar to the actions of Albert Gonzalez a few years earlier, a group of hackers in 
June 2011 managed to acquire the data from 360,000 Citibank credit card owners. Two 
years later, the FBI charged five Ukrainian and Russian hackers with possession of over 
160 million credit card numbers, resulting in a loss of over a hundred million dollars. 
More recently, in December 2013, credit and debit card information of over 40 million 
shoppers at the retail giant Target were stolen and sold on a well-known organized crime 
forum in Eastern Europe.145 The full magnitude of this breach was still under 
investigation at the time of this research. 
Recent high-profile cyber events, such as Heartbleed, Target’s data breach, and 
Sony Corp’s hack, among several others, have led to new talks within other CI sectors, 
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including the Information Technology (IT), and Communications Sectors. The Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) recently began an initiative to align its 
cybersecurity activities with NIST’s Framework—calling on all members within the 
industry to invest in innovation and professional development. FCC Chairman Tom 
Wheeler stated that the private sector will lead the initiative, but be government backed, 
and will “identify public goals, work with the affected stakeholders… and let that 
experience inform whether there is any need for next steps.”146 Wheeler believes that 
aligning efforts with the framework will increase situational awareness, minimize 
cybersecurity risk, and improve innovation and professional development within the 
technology and communications industry.147 Increasing attacks on critical networks that 
hold personal data stresses the need for a more structured approach involving both public 
and private sector collaboration. 
4. 2014 Surge in Cyber Criminal Activity 
While the previous section focused on cybersecurity issues between the years 
2006 and 2013, the recent surge of cyber-attacks on networks that hold personal data in 
2014 (during the writing of this thesis) cannot be overlooked; thus, they are noted herein 
to help establish the importance of this research. A recent article published by Forbes 
listed the top 20 major data breaches of 2014 from malware designed to seize debit and 
credit card information to the compromise of private records, including social security 
numbers.148 Table 1 lists the top ten breaches based on the highest number of people 
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Company/entity # affected Data compromised 
eBay 233 mil Contact/login info 
JP Morgan Chase 76+ mil Private records 
Home Depot 56 mil Debit/credit/e-mail 
Community Health Sys 4.5 mil Private records 
Michaels 2.6 mil Debit/credit info 
Staples 1.16 mil Debit/credit info 
Goodwill 868,000 Debit/credit info 
Aaron Brothers 400,000 Debit/credit info 
Sally Beauty 280,000 Debit/credit info 
Sony 62,000* SSNs/Private records 
*Investigation ongoing 
Table 1.   Major Data Breaches of 2014149 
C. FS-ISAC 
The Financial Services Information Sharing Analysis Center (FS-ISAC) is one of 
several threat information sharing centers that provide two-way sharing of cybersecurity 
threats between private owners and operators of CI and government agencies. It was 
established in 1999 as one of the first ISACs created in response to Presidential Decision 
Directive 63 (PDD-63), which was later superseded by Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 7 (HSPD-7). PDD-63 called for the establishment of an information-sharing 
hub between both public and private sectors to exchange cybersecurity threats, 
vulnerabilities, risk assessments, and best practices to enhance protection U.S. critical 
infrastructure.150 As mentioned in Chapter III, ISACs have been performing as successful 
examples of cybersecurity information-sharing PPPs.151 Since inception, membership 
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within the FS-ISAC has grown to nearly 5,500 members152—not only within the 
Americas, but globally. In 2013, the ISAC expanded its partnership to participating 
companies in the regions of Europe, Middle East, and Asia-Pacific.153 FS-ISAC 
participation is recommended by the following government agencies: U.S. Treasury, U.S. 
Secret Service, DHS, and the FSSCC.154 
Beyond facilitating the sharing of cyber threat information, the FS-ISAC has 
supported several annual cybersecurity exercises that test the capabilities of financial 
institutions to respond and recover from cyber-attacks.155 The most recent exercise was 
the 5th Annual Cyber Attack Against Payment Processes Simulation (CAPP) held in 
September 2014, which tested nearly 1,000 participating financial institutions (that utilize 
payment services) to respond to multiple simulated cyber-attacks in two separate, two-
day robust cybersecurity scenarios.156 In addition to the invaluable experience gained, 
these CAPP exercises are offered to any institution that utilizes payment services at no 
cost—allowing small-to-medium sized companies to participate—which ultimately 
expands the participation potential of the private sector in information-sharing PPPs. 
In an effort to address both public and private sector concerns of the timely 
exchange of cyber-related threat information, the FS-ISAC has adopted the use of two 
new (DHS driven) automated sharing initiatives that aim to speed up the process of 
collecting and disseminating cyber-attack data. The Structured Threat Information 
eXpression (STIX) and Trusted Automated eXchange of Indicator Information (TAXII) 
programs—initiated and backed by DHS—were designed to help private companies and 
government agencies streamline (at no cost) their methods of sharing critical cyber threat 
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information automatically versus manually.157 FS-ISAC’s continual effort to endorse 
programs that encourage information-sharing within the banking and financial industry; 
simplify the methods in which information is shared; and more importantly, address the 
concerns of both sectors, such as the lack of timely exchange of threat information, only 
reinforces the value and necessity for private firms to become active participants. Despite 
such efforts to spur participation, private industry is still finding difficulty in contributing 
to PPPs. 
D. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
In an environment lacking legislation that requires companies to adopt tighter 
cybersecurity measures, a current evaluation of the effectiveness of information sharing 
between public and private sector agencies should: first, help identify barriers to 
establishing cybersecurity PPPs; and second, add value to existing knowledge in 
cybersecurity issues involving the compromise of U.S. banking and finance 
infrastructure. Recent testimony from cybersecurity and industry professionals and other 
empirical research on cybersecurity information-sharing reveal several underlying issues 
inhibiting public-private cooperation. 
In the spring of 2013, the National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration (NTIA) and NIST requested—under direction from the president—an 
evaluation of incentives established by DHS that encourage information sharing and 
adoption of NISTs Framework (still in development at the time). Among the many 
participants was the Financial Services Sector Coordinating Council (FSSCC) for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection and Homeland Security—established in 2002 for the purpose of 
coordinating critical infrastructure protection efforts within the financial sector.158 In 
response to NTIA’s inquiry, the FSSCC identified several private business concerns with 
private-public collaboration within the financial sector. The Financial Services Sector 
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Coordinating Council (FSSCC) argued that “issues of information sharing, misaligned 
incentives, criminal penalties and access to government resources” must be resolved if 
financial institutions are to adopt incentives, such as those outlined in NISTs 
Framework—a tool designed to improve and encourage information sharing between 
both public and private divisions across all sectors of CI.159 
The council found it challenging to offer incentives to private owners and 
operators of CI within the financial sector to adopt the framework that encourages 
information-sharing when standards and requirements are unclear.160 The financial sector 
is already subject to many regulation requirements, such as federal and state laws; 
including cybersecurity examination standards derived from the Financial Services 
Modernization Act of 1999—law that establishes standards for businesses within the 
finance sector, such as brokerage firms, commercial banks, and insurance companies, to 
collaborate with one another.161 Thus, in the absence of clear guidelines that will either 
become additional requirements or become an entirely new standard, private financial 
companies will continue to abide by existing regulations, which could deter many private 
financial firms from collaborating with government agencies. 
Another area of concern identified by the FSSCC is the lack of timely exchanges 
of threat information between both public and private agencies; information that could 
aid in creating adequate protective measures against malicious online activity.162 Five 
years after the GAO reported the same findings (discussed in Chapter I: Literature 
Review): the same information-sharing issues appear to be troubling the banking and 
finance CI sector. The FSSCC also conveyed private sector concerns about the balance of 
incentives and disincentives between attackers and defenders—lack of law enforcement 
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prosecuting cyber-criminal activity.163 While private businesses expect state and federal 
law enforcement to seek out and prosecute criminals, issues of attribution and the lack of 
resources to investigate cyber-crimes make it almost impossible to deter cyber criminals 
or bring them to justice; furthermore, banks and other financial institutions usually 
sustain losses from cyber-attacks, such as data theft and trade secrets, that are impossible 
to recover.164 The imbalance of incentives and disincentives between private financial 
firms and cyber criminals—coupled with the government’s inability to protect and 
prosecute—could yet be another deterrent to greater private-public collaboration. 
While initial concerns of violating anti-trust laws and the FIOA have hindered the 
establishment of cybersecurity PPPs in earlier years, one constant barrier has continued to 
be trust issues between the public and private sector. While the majority of literature 
surrounding cybersecurity PPPs identifies a lack of trust across all sectors of CI as the 
chief concern among both private and government agencies, the banking and finance 
industry has begun to develop and experience other concerns. In his testimony before the 
U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs in March 2014, 
Steven R. Chabinsky expressed his concerns of cybersecurity partnerships between the 
public and private sector. Among those include: non-disclosure agreements preventing 
private businesses from sharing threat information with the government; arduous 
background checks for private firms seeking clearance to classified threat information 
from the government; larger companies with a global footprint sharing sensitive, 
government-provided threat information with other security firms abroad; U.S. 
government agencies sharing newly discovered private business vulnerabilities with other 
foreign law enforcement and intelligence agencies; and free-riding companies that 
participate only to collect threat information and to network with other agencies but 
contribute minimally, or even not at all.165 
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Despite an increase in information flow between the public and private sector in 
the finance industry, such as the 2009 cybercrime collaboration of the FBI, FS-ISAC, and 
National Automated Clearinghouse Association (NACHA)—a recent PPP effort aimed at 
ensuring information exchange between all parties occurs in a timely and tailored 
manner—private companies have expressed their concerns over the government’s 
uncoordinated influx of bulky and sometimes irrelevant threat information. In other 
words, government agencies are simply pushing unfiltered data to private agencies that 
either a) companies already had knowledge of; b) was irrelevant; c) without specific 
requests from individual clients.166 Chabinksy’s testimony serves as evidence that 
supports what the GAO found 5 years earlier, when it surveyed five separate CI sectors 
(noted in Chapter I). Thus, private industry continues to be concerned that government 
agencies are measuring their information-sharing successes on quantity versus quality, 
irrespective to the actual utility of threat information, thus serving as another deterrent for 
private-public cooperation. 
In his testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs in March 2014, Steven R. Chabinsky echoed what the FSSCC had 
been arguing just one year prior: the unbalanced costs between attackers and 
defenders.167 While attackers continue to increasingly penetrate banking and financial 
networks at a low and sometimes even zero cost, defenders (private industry) continue to 
see a rise in cybersecurity costs. Private companies are concerned that the government is 
ineffective in challenging and prosecuting cyber-criminal activity. The recent alleged 
DDoS attacks from the countries of North Korea and Iran on U.S. financial institutions 
are an example of how the government has left network security up to the private 
sector.168 While private companies continue to focus their resources on reducing 
vulnerabilities, the government seems to remain disengaged in providing adequate 
protection, thus increasing security costs to private sector businesses. 
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In May 2014, the New York Department of Financial Services (NYDFS) issued 
its Report on Cybersecurity in the Banking Sector, which surveyed 154 financial 
institutions on the status of their cybersecurity programs and participation in information-
sharing partnerships. While the organization’s report focused mainly on current 
cybersecurity programs and barriers within its own organizations, it also discovered, 
however, that participation in information-sharing partnerships of small- to medium-sized 
financial institutions (whose assets were between less than $1 billion to $10 billion) was 
much lower than their larger financial associates (whose assets were greater than $10 
billion).169 Figure 2 illustrates the NYDFS’s findings. 
 
Figure 2.  Financial Institution Participation in Information-sharing170 
The report noted that while over 60% of larger financial institutions reported 
participating in information-sharing coalitions, such as the FS-ISAC, fewer than 25% of 
smaller corporations were—due, in part, to limited financial resources despite the costs 
for membership in ISACs for smaller financial institutions being relatively low when 
compared to the benefits of receiving timely physical and cyber threat information.171 
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The report concludes that despite a recent increase of private financial firms willing to 
share threat information and participate in ISACs, there are numerous others that remain 
on the fence over the fear of exposing any weakness to the public—or worse, to their 
competitors.172 
Another challenge to private-public information sharing is found within the 
Information Technology (IT) sector. As previously noted in Chapter I, cybersecurity 
issues within the FS sector oftentimes fall into other sectors, such as the IT sector. 
Frequently, the lines between cybersecurity information sharing within the IT and FS 
sectors become blurred, such as a network breach of a major retailer that results in 
financial loss. Thus, it is important to include evidence within the IT sector in this 
chapter. One of those challenges is the difference in threat perception among government 
and private industry, despite sharing similar interests. In a 2013 interview, IT-ISAC 
Executive Director Scott Algeier shared his assessment of cybersecurity information 
sharing between public-private entities. Algeier did not believe (at the time) that 
information-sharing was where it needed to be: despite the many successes, such as 
establishing a baseline risk assessment for the IT sector, which concentrates on low 
probability-high consequence and high probability-low consequence cyber events, most 
of these successes are private sector centered rather than joint initiatives. “We have a lot 
of individual initiatives, but we [do not] have an integrated program,” Algeier argued.173 
He observed that one of the primary challenges of private-public cyber information-
sharing is how the private IT industry perceives cyber threats. According to Algeier, 
government agencies view cyber threats and vulnerabilities on a national security level, 
whereas private companies are primarily concerned about how those cyber threats and 
vulnerabilities affect business. “Industry and government have common interests, but we 
look at the threats in a different way,” stated Algeier.174 Although government agencies 
continue to focus on worst-case scenarios, in Algeier’s opinion private companies are not 
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convinced these scenarios are the most likely.175 Due to continual changes in how private 
industry discloses threat vulnerabilities, such as disclosing weaknesses to stakeholders 
and customers before sharing with public agencies, information-sharing hubs like the  
FS and IT-ISACs continually look for new ways to improve threat information sharing; 
for example, facilitating discussion about cyber-attacks that companies currently 
experience.176 
Further challenges to private-public information-sharing were noted in a recent 
Senate hearing on cybersecurity before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, 
and Urban Affairs. In December 2014, the Director of Treasury’s Office of Critical 
Infrastructure Protection and Compliance Policy (OCIP), Brian Peretti, briefed the Senate 
on the current state of cybersecurity efforts between both public and private sectors and 
the Department of Treasury’s role in fostering those relationships. While he identified 
several reoccurring challenges, such as declassifying threat information for private sector 
use and increasing efficiency in the information-sharing process, Peretti noted that many 
private sector companies are still apprehensive in sharing threat information due to the 
lack of clear legal guidelines.177 Some government agencies have attempted to ease those 
concerns. The Department of Justice (DOJ) recently addressed privacy concerns over 
sharing threat information containing consumer information in a white paper titled: 
Sharing Cyberthreat Information Under 18 USC § 2702(a)(3).178 The DOJ viewed the 
Stored Communications Act (SCA)—the law that prohibits sharing consumer 
information—as a regulation that would permit private companies to share cyber-related 
threat information with government agencies so long as the data is collective in nature 
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and does not single out any one individual.179 Despite such attempts to read between the 
legal lines, many private companies are still reluctant to share data with the government 
due to fears of public disclosure (e.g., the Snowden revelations), preventing private 
companies from conducting their own damage control and finding a resolution before 
public exposure.180 This is concerning to private financial firms in relation to exposure 
due to the large pool of government actors involved: the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Department of Justice (DOJ), 
National Security Agency (NSA), and U.S. CYBERCOM.181 Each of these agencies has 
a unique role in regulating cybersecurity, which only increases the probability of an 
unintentional or accidental exposure.182 
E. SUMMARY 
Both private and public institutions that operate within the finance CI sector 
continue to depend on the security of our nation’s financial networks for trade and 
communication. Increasing cyber-attacks to banks, financial institutions, and individuals 
from criminals, hactivists, and even states—primarily China and Iran—require the use of 
information sharing PPPs to increase security and efficiency in both public and private 
networks, and help close the gap in government and private sector cooperation. For 15 
years, the FS-ISAC has continued to develop ways and means of facilitating 
cybersecurity information sharing between government agencies and private companies; 
most notably, their annual CAPP exercises that test the resiliency of private companies to 
respond to multiple cyber-attacks, and endorsement of the STIX and TAXII programs 
designed to speed up the information sharing process. The FSSCC and NIST have also 
made notable strides in fostering the creation of PPPs to enhance cybersecurity 
information sharing within the financial sector. 
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This chapter assessed the current challenges facing the establishment of PPPs to 
advance cyber information sharing within the finance sector of critical infrastructure. 
Those concerns include: lack of trust, lack of incentives, and timely exchange of threat 
information; differences in threat perception; free-riding institutions that only collect 
rather than share threat information; government agencies pushing useless, unfiltered 
data; limited resources (assets) for smaller companies; and fears of legal and reputation 
damages due to public disclosure. The evidence found in this case study suggests that 
there are several other explanations beyond the original three hypotheses proposed in 
Chapter I. The validation of the original three and the additional explanations are 
discussed in the next chapter. Despite the significant hurdles facing both sides in 
collaborating, the recent surge in cyber-attacks targeting U.S. critical infrastructure 
should be incentive enough for companies to get onboard with the PPP concept. It is 
reasonable to argue, based on evidence presented in this chapter, that the efforts from the 
FS-ISAC, IT-ISAC, FSSCC, and NIST, are not only addressing the concerns of private 
companies in the finance industry, but also making positive strides towards breaking 









Chapter I introduced the topic of cybersecurity within the public-private sector to 
set up the major thesis question: Why do cybersecurity information-sharing problems 
exist between government agencies and private companies? It also established the 
importance of the research; explored the prevalent literature on cybersecurity 
information-sharing within the public and private sector; provided three potential 
hypotheses that best explain why barriers to public and private cooperation in cyber 
information-sharing exist today; and identified the banking and finance CI sector as the 
most promising case study to validate the three explanations. As stated in Chapter I, the 
banking and finance sector has not only experienced a significant increase in cyber-
attacks—to include identity theft and breaches of major retail companies—but also has 
the potential to suffer the most catastrophic damage to the nation’s security, economy, 
and way of life. Thus, this thesis recognized the finance industry as the most prominent 
sector in which to examine and gather new evidence. 
Chapter II provided a background of the more recent cyber-related attacks across 
various sectors of CI to further establish the importance and urgency of cybersecurity 
information-sharing between the public and private sectors. The chapter also offered a 
brief description of the most recent controversial cybersecurity policies and legislation 
dilemmas relevant to this research—including CISA, EO 13636, PPD-21, and the 2013 
NIPP; and DHS and NIST’s response to various cybersecurity requirements ordered 
under EO 13636—such as NIST’s Cybersecurity Framework and DHS’s CeVP program. 
Chapter III introduced the concept of cybersecurity public-private partnerships 
(PPP) and identified several factors that promote, challenge, and limit the establishment 
of, and agency participation in, cybersecurity information-sharing partnerships to defend 
against cyber-related threats. This chapter identified and discussed current cybersecurity 
PPPs in action—such as the Enduring Security Framework (the collaboration of several 
major IT and defense companies that meet several times annually to discuss current cyber 
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threats and best practices); the National Cyber Forensics and Training Alliance (public-
private effort that supports the timely exchange of up-to-date cyber threats and cyber-
related crimes that occur within sectors, including the finance sector); and the major 
public-private effort that went into developing NIST’s Cybersecurity Framework 1.0. 
While information-sharing between both sectors has improved, several challenges, such 
as lack of trust, legal barriers, and failed expectations, continue to hinder the success of 
PPPs in cybersecurity. 
Chapter IV explored the banking and financial CI sector to identify and assess the 
current challenges facing the establishment of PPPs to advance cyber information-sharing 
between the government and private companies. Lack of trust and incentives, timely 
exchange of threat information, varying threat perceptions, free-riding, sharing of useless 
or unfiltered data, limited resources for smaller businesses, and fears of legal liability and 
damage to company image were the common themes found within the financial sector 
that continue to inhibit the success of information-sharing PPPs. This evidence not only 
validates the three hypotheses introduced in Chapter I, it also reveals several other 
explanations that are discussed in the next section. 
B. HYPOTHESIS TEST 
The three proposed hypotheses will now be tested based on evidence provided in 
Chapters III and IV in an effort to answer the major research question of why 
information-sharing problems exist between government agencies and private companies. 
While this evidence helps validate the three explanations introduced in Chapter I, it also 
reveals several others; thus, those additional findings are provided following validation of 
the initial three hypotheses. 
1. Hypothesis One:  
Participation in PPPs is less likely to occur when either side fails to share 
cyber-related information in a timely and accurate manner. 
This explanation assumes that both government and private businesses expect 
these to be the minimum requirements for participation in a cybersecurity information-
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sharing alliance. While earlier literature (discussed in Chapter I) was used to arrive at this 
explanation, evidence found in Chapter IV equally supports this hypothesis. 
a. Timely Exchange of Threat Information 
Despite recent and ongoing efforts of PPPs, such as FS-ISAC’s automated sharing 
initiatives, STIX and TAXII;183 and NCFTA’s cybercrime network,184 to increase the 
timely exchange of cyber-related threat information, further evidence found in Chapter 
IV corroborates the claim of this first hypothesis. One example is the FSSCC’s finding 
that both public and private companies within the banking and finance sector lack timely 
sharing of cyber-related threat information that could facilitate the creation of adequate 
protective programs against malicious online activity.185 Another example is found in 
Steven Chabinsky’s testimony that despite the recent increase in information flow 
between both sectors within the finance industry, private companies continue to express 
concern over the government’s push of uncoordinated, bulky, irrelevant, and unsolicited 
threat information.186 Private firms worry that the government is more concerned about 
quantity versus quality without regard to the actual utility of the information being 
shared. Further support of this hypothesis is found in Manuel Suter’s cybersecurity 
briefing—held in Zurich, Switzerland in 2010—in which he identified misplaced 
expectations between both government and private companies as one of several major 
challenges facing cybersecurity information sharing PPPs aimed at protecting CI.187 
2. Hypothesis Two 
Private companies feel threatened by cybersecurity regulations and 
standards that increase security costs, risk the loss of market share, and lack 
incentives, thus decreasing the likelihood of PPP participation. 
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This hypothesis assumes that companies are less likely to share cyber-related 
information when government regulations and standards create at least one of the three 
conditions: security cost increase; risk to market share; and lack of incentives. While 
earlier evidence provided in the literature review aided in producing this hypothesis, 
further evidence found in both Chapters III and IV equally supports this second 
explanation. The three identified conditions in this hypothesis are discussed below 
separately. 
a. Security Cost Increase 
Both Chabinsky and the FSSCC found that private companies are concerned with 
the unbalanced costs between attackers and defenders.188 While attackers continue to 
increasingly penetrate banking and financial networks at a low and sometimes even zero 
cost, Chabinsky argued that private companies continue to see a rise in cybersecurity 
costs. For example, recent DDoS attacks from other nation states, such as North Korea 
and Iran, has the private sector worried that big government is leaving individual 
companies on their own to defend against such attacks.189 Private companies are forced 
to focus their resources on reducing vulnerabilities while the government remains 
disengaged, thus increasing security costs to private businesses.190 
b. Risk to Market Share 
The NYDFS’s Report on Cybersecurity in the Banking Sector found that despite 
the recent increase of private financial firms willing to share threat information and 
participate in information-sharing PPPs, such as the FS-ISAC, numerous private 
companies remain reluctant due to fears of exposing weakness, not only to consumers but 
also to other competing companies within the finance industry.191 Further evidence 
suggests that many private companies are still reluctant to share data with the government 
due to fears of public disclosure, such as the recent Edward Snowden revelations. Public 
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leaks, such as this, prevent individual private companies from conducting damage control 
and establishing resolution prior to public exposure, thus resulting in a higher risk of 
market share loss to competitors.192 Additionally, the risk of market share loss due to 
unintentional or accidental exposure increases significantly when multiple government 
agencies, such as the FTC, SEC, DOJ, U.S. CYBERCOM, and NSA, become involved in 
regulating cybersecurity, further preventing private companies from participating in PPPs 
that share cyber-threat information.193 
c. Lack of Incentives 
While ISACs facilitate the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of cyber 
threat information, problems such as free riding—companies that participate only to 
collect threat information while making no contribution—often result from the lack of 
adequate incentives.194 A major limitation to information-sharing PPPs, such as the FS-
ISAC, is that most are voluntary and lack the necessary incentives to encourage 
participation; in other words, information shared is limited to information received.195 
Further evidence, provided by the FSSCC, suggests that private companies feel that a 
lack of criminal penalties and limited access to government resources must be resolved if 
private financial institutions are to adopt incentives, such as those defined in NIST’s 
framework—designed to improve and encourage information sharing between both 
public and private entities across all sectors of CI.196 The FSSCC also found that offering 
incentives to private owners and operators within the financial sector to adopt the 
framework is a major challenge when standards and requirements are unclear.197 Further 
discussion of NIST’s Framework is provided in Chapter II. The FSSCC also argued that 
the balance of incentives and disincentives between attackers and defenders also concerns 
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private companies.198 Private businesses expect law enforcement to prosecute cyber-
criminal activity; however, issues of attribution and lack of resources to investigate 
cyber-crimes have made it difficult to deter cyber criminals. Furthermore, financial 
institutions have sustained unrecoverable losses from cyber-attacks, such as data theft and 
trade secrets.199 The imbalance of incentives and disincentives between private financial 
firms and cyber criminals—coupled with the government’s inability to protect and 
prosecute—continue to deter private-public collaboration.  
3. Hypothesis Three 
Small- to medium-sized private sector companies lack the necessary 
resources to participate in information-sharing cybersecurity PPPs. 
While the evidence presented in this thesis to support this hypothesis is 
significantly less than the first two, it is worth noting the findings provided in Chapter IV 
that help support this claim.  
a. Small- to Medium-Sized Companies Lack Resources 
Despite the lack of substantial evidence on small-to-medium sized financial 
companies’ ability or willingness to participate in cybersecurity information-sharing 
PPPs, the NYDFS’s Report on Cybersecurity in the Banking Sector is one respectable 
source. As noted in Chapter IV, the report found that fewer than 25% of smaller 
corporations were participating in information-sharing partnerships, such as the FS-
ISAC, due to limited financial resources—despite the costs for membership of most 
ISACs for smaller financial institutions (whose assets were less than $1 billion) being 
relatively low compared to the benefits of receiving timely physical and cyber threat 
information.200 Figure 2 in Chapter IV illustrates the NYDFS’s findings and compares 
smaller companies with their larger associates. It is also worth noting that while recent 
cybersecurity exercises, such as the FS-ISAC’s annual Cyber Attack Against Payment 
Processes Simulation (CAPP), have attracted many small- to medium-sized companies to 
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participate at no cost—potentially expanding participation of private firms in 
information-sharing PPPs—this thesis found no evidence or data to support this claim.201 
Further research into individual financial firms could reveal additional data, which was 
outside the scope of this thesis. 
4. Additional Explanations 
In addition to the three hypotheses tested above, this thesis found several other 
common and credible explanations as to why barriers exist between government agencies 
and private companies within the financial sector. The likely barriers identified in both 
Chapters III (Cybersecurity PPPs) and IV (Financial Sector Case Study) include: 
 Lack of trust 
 Fears of legal and reputation damages due to public disclosure  
 Diverging interests, such as differences in threat perception 
 Free-riding due to volunteer nature of information-sharing 
 Limited resources for smaller companies 
Although the challenges and limitations to establishing and employing 
information-sharing PPPs to effectively counter cyber threats are numerous, this thesis 
found these to be the most prominent concerns among public and private sector entities 
within the banking and financial CI sector. 
C. CONSIDERATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
While this thesis explored cybersecurity issues between the government and 
private sector utilizing only published information (such as academic journals, 
interviews, opinion pieces, and government reports), future research that includes 
personal interviews with Executives, Information Officers, and IT specialists of major 
private companies could reveal additional barriers that inhibit public-private cooperation. 
To ensure the credibility of these sources, every effort should be made to avoid source 
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anonymity. Additionally, while this thesis focused exclusively on the banking and 
finance CI sector, future research could include a cross-sector comparison among other 
similar CI sectors, such as the IT and communications sector, in an effort to identify the 
similarities and differences of how each sector deals with information-sharing problems. 
Similarly, an evaluation of how the several different ISACs foster information-sharing 
between the government and private sector companies could add value to the existing 
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